Arizona Supreme Court holds constables have judicial immunity except for intentional misconduct.

An apartment manager accompanied a constable in serving a writ of restitution against a tenant.  The tenant shot and killed the constable, the apartment manager, and a bystander.  The apartment manager’s surviving spouse sued the constable’s spouse, alleging that the constable was negligent and grossly negligent in failing to protect and avoid exposing the public to harm while serving the writ of restitution.  The apartment manager’s spouse also alleged that the constable was under the influence of cocaine, alcohol, and other illicit substances while serving the writ.  

The constable’s spouse moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the constable was protected by judicial immunity and did not owe a duty of care to the apartment manager.  The superior court denied the motion. 

The court of appeals accepted special action jurisdiction.  The court of appeals found that the constable was judicially immune from liability because, even if her actions were negligent or grossly negligent, they did not constitute “misconduct” under A.R.S. § 11-449. 

On review, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s ruling and vacated the court of appeals’ decision.  The Court first determined that constables are entitled to common law judicial immunity when they execute orders of the court, including writs of restitution.   However, a person who acts contrary to a court’s directive forfeits judicial immunity. 

The Court then considered whether A.R.S. § 11-449, which provides that a sheriff who is “guilty of any misconduct” in the service or execution of a writ is “liable to the party aggrieved for damages sustained,” abrogates the common law principle of judicial immunity.  The Court determined that A.R.S. § 11-449 limits the scope of judicial immunity if a constable is “guilty of any misconduct” in the service or execution of a writ.

Finally, the Court analyzed the meaning of the word “misconduct.”  Applying principles of statutory interpretation and corpus linguistics, the Court held that “misconduct” means a violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm.  In the context of A.R.S. § 11-449, a constable engages in misconduct—and is thus not immune from liability—if he or she willfully or intentional fails to carry out a court directive, law, or rule.  Because the apartment manager’s spouse alleged only that the constable was negligent and grossly negligent, not engaged in willful or intentional misconduct, the constable is entitled to judicial immunity.       

In a concurrence, Justice Timmer wrote separately to “pump the brakes” on the Court’s reliance on corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation, especially without the parties’ adversarial input into database selection and interpretive methodology.

Vice Chief Justice Lopez authored the opinion of the Court, with Chief Justice Timmer concurring.

Posted by: Sarah Pook Lawson