Arizona Supreme Court holds that A.R.S. § 12-821’s one-year limitations period does not apply to claims brought by one public entity against another, leaving the common-law nullum tempus doctrine intact.

In 2002, the City of Chandler entered into a long-term agreement with the Roosevelt Water Conservation District (“Roosevelt”) under which Roosevelt agreed to deliver water to Chandler through 2086. In 2018, Roosevelt notified Chandler that it considered the agreement terminated. Chandler responded that any termination would be a breach, but did not sue. Over the next several years, Chandler periodically asked Roosevelt to deliver water under the agreement, and Roosevelt repeatedly refused. Chandler finally sued in 2022, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and declaratory judgment.

The central issue was whether Chandler’s claims were time-barred under A.R.S. § 12-821. Under that provision, “[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Chandler argued that the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi—“time does not run against the king”—exempted its claims from the statute. Under that doctrine, statutes of limitations do not run against the State when it acts as a plaintiff. The superior court ruled for Chandler on a different ground (each refusal to deliver water was a fresh breach), but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the legislature’s use of “all actions” in § 12-821 was broad enough to abrogate nullum tempus.

The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and reversed the superior court on the nullum tempus ground. The Court reaffirmed its long-standing rule that abrogation of the common law requires an express legislative directive or necessary implication, and that nullum tempus in particular can be displaced only by a statute that “expressly and definitely” says so. Critically, the Court emphasized that nullum tempus concerns the identity of the plaintiff, not the nature of the litigation. Because § 12-821 is framed entirely around the defendant—it limits actions “against any public entity”—it does not speak to the State’s status as a plaintiff and therefore cannot expressly override the doctrine.

As a result, Chandler’s claims were timely, the agreement was valid and enforceable, and Chandler was entitled to summary judgment.

Justice Bolick dissented. In his view, § 12-821 is “categorical” and “admits of no exceptions.” He argued that when a clear statute conflicts with a common law doctrine, the statute prevails, and that the majority effectively rewrote § 12-821 by reading in a “private-plaintiff” limitation that the legislature did not include.

Justice Beene authored the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Timmer, Vice Chief Justice Lopez, Justices Montgomery and King, and Judge O’Neil (sitting by designation). Justice Bolick dissented. Justice Cruz was recused.

Posted by: Allie Karpurk