AZAPP is a blog that provides a thorough, up-to-date, and efficient resource to stay abreast of significant developments concerning civil cases in Arizona's appellate courts - the two Divisions of the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Thursday, August 25, 2005
Mobile Community Council for Progress, Inc. v. The Honorable Fulton Brock: Division One Affirms the Two-Thirds Majority Voting Requirement of ARS § 11-824(C) Is Satisfied by a Three-to-One Vote When One Board Member is Disqualified
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors voted on an amendment to the County Area Plan. One of the five Board members recused himself from voting due to a conflict of interest. The remaining members approved the amendment, with three members voting for and one against. Mobile Community Council filed a complaint alleging that pursuant to ARS § 11-824(C), which required the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the board to pass an amendment, more than three affirmative votes were required. The trial court granted a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Board, relying on Croaff v. Evans, 130 Ariz. 353, 636 P.2d 131 (App. 1981) Judge Irvine, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed. The court noted that the language of ARS § 11-824(C) does not require an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the “elected” board members and the disqualification of the board member reduced the total membership of the Board to the number of remaining members who were entitled to vote.
Judge Irvine wrote the opinion; Judges Kessler and Thompson joined.
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors voted on an amendment to the County Area Plan. One of the five Board members recused himself from voting due to a conflict of interest. The remaining members approved the amendment, with three members voting for and one against. Mobile Community Council filed a complaint alleging that pursuant to ARS § 11-824(C), which required the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the board to pass an amendment, more than three affirmative votes were required. The trial court granted a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the Board, relying on Croaff v. Evans, 130 Ariz. 353, 636 P.2d 131 (App. 1981) Judge Irvine, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed. The court noted that the language of ARS § 11-824(C) does not require an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the “elected” board members and the disqualification of the board member reduced the total membership of the Board to the number of remaining members who were entitled to vote.
Judge Irvine wrote the opinion; Judges Kessler and Thompson joined.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Aug 25, 2005
Wednesday, August 24, 2005
Urias v. PCS Health Systems, Inc.: Division One Holds that Drug Rebates were “Mutual Debts” that Could Be Set Off Against a Corresponding Debt
An insurer owed money to a health care provider for prescription drug reimbursement payments. The health care provider had collected volume discount rebates from drug manufacturers which it normally would be obligated to pass on to the insurer. However, after the insurer was placed into receivership, the health care provider asserted its right to retain the rebate funds as an offset against its debt to the insurer under A.R.S. § 20-638, a statute governing insolvent insurers which allows for the offset of “mutual debts” in these circumstances. The insurer filed an action to recover the rebate funds, but the trial judge granted summary judgment for the health care provider. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that the statute provided no definition of “mutual debts,” the Court looked to Black’s Law Dictionary and caselaw illuminating the term’s “accepted common law meaning.” Drawing from these sources, the Court concluded that “mutual debts” are obligations that are “due to and from the same parties in the same capacities.” The Court held that this definition applied to the rebates, since they related to contractual obligations that ran directly between the parties. The Court accordingly upheld the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment to the health care provider and awarded it attorney’s fees.
The opinion was authored by Judge Gemmill and joined by Judges Lankford and Sult.
An insurer owed money to a health care provider for prescription drug reimbursement payments. The health care provider had collected volume discount rebates from drug manufacturers which it normally would be obligated to pass on to the insurer. However, after the insurer was placed into receivership, the health care provider asserted its right to retain the rebate funds as an offset against its debt to the insurer under A.R.S. § 20-638, a statute governing insolvent insurers which allows for the offset of “mutual debts” in these circumstances. The insurer filed an action to recover the rebate funds, but the trial judge granted summary judgment for the health care provider. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that the statute provided no definition of “mutual debts,” the Court looked to Black’s Law Dictionary and caselaw illuminating the term’s “accepted common law meaning.” Drawing from these sources, the Court concluded that “mutual debts” are obligations that are “due to and from the same parties in the same capacities.” The Court held that this definition applied to the rebates, since they related to contractual obligations that ran directly between the parties. The Court accordingly upheld the trial judge’s grant of summary judgment to the health care provider and awarded it attorney’s fees.
The opinion was authored by Judge Gemmill and joined by Judges Lankford and Sult.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Aug 24, 2005
Friday, August 12, 2005
Grammatico v. Industrial Commission: Arizona Supreme Court Strikes Down Two Statutory Provisions that Limit Workers’ Compensation Rights
In an unanimous decision, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that statutory provisions limiting workers’ compensation if drugs or alcohol were a contributing cause of the injury violates Article 18, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. In so ruling, the court resolved conflicting opinions of the Court of Appeals: Grammatico v. Industrial Commission and Komalestewa v. Industrial Commission and held that the drug and alcohol provisions of A.R.S. §§ 23-1021(C), 23-1021(D) are unconstitutional.
The court grounded its holding in both the history and the language of Article 18, Section 8. The court explained that the workers’ compensation system was created as a no fault alternative to common law negligence claims for injured workers. The Arizona Constitution directed the Legislature to create the statutory scheme for workers’ compensation. Under Article 18, Section 8, that system must provide for payment to workers injured in the course of employment where the injury was “caused in whole, or in part, or is contributed to, by a necessary risk or danger of such employment.”
Workers’ compensation is a no fault system, but the Legislature is empowered to regulate the issue of legal causation within constitutional limits. This case turned on whether limiting recovery when drugs or alcohol were a contributing cause of the injury is a permissible restriction on legal causation. The court concluded that requiring the employee to prove that drugs or alcohol did not play a part in causing the injury amounted to requiring the employee to prove that the injury was wholly caused by the risks of employment. However, the Constitution requires only that the injury was caused in part by the risks of employment. Thus, the court concluded that the statutes impermissibly restricted legal causation.
The court also addressed an argument that Legislature is empowered to restrict recovery where drugs and alcohol are involved because the injury must be caused by a “necessary risk or danger of such employment.” Quoting the Court of Appeals panel in Grammatico below, the Supreme Court declared that “such a definition of ‘a necessary risk or danger of . . . employment,’ would impermissibly ‘inject[] fault into the no-fault workers’ compensation system and effectively abrogate[] claims for injuries partially caused or contributed to by workplace dangers.’”
Justice Ryan wrote the opinion for the court.
In an unanimous decision, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that statutory provisions limiting workers’ compensation if drugs or alcohol were a contributing cause of the injury violates Article 18, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. In so ruling, the court resolved conflicting opinions of the Court of Appeals: Grammatico v. Industrial Commission and Komalestewa v. Industrial Commission and held that the drug and alcohol provisions of A.R.S. §§ 23-1021(C), 23-1021(D) are unconstitutional.
The court grounded its holding in both the history and the language of Article 18, Section 8. The court explained that the workers’ compensation system was created as a no fault alternative to common law negligence claims for injured workers. The Arizona Constitution directed the Legislature to create the statutory scheme for workers’ compensation. Under Article 18, Section 8, that system must provide for payment to workers injured in the course of employment where the injury was “caused in whole, or in part, or is contributed to, by a necessary risk or danger of such employment.”
Workers’ compensation is a no fault system, but the Legislature is empowered to regulate the issue of legal causation within constitutional limits. This case turned on whether limiting recovery when drugs or alcohol were a contributing cause of the injury is a permissible restriction on legal causation. The court concluded that requiring the employee to prove that drugs or alcohol did not play a part in causing the injury amounted to requiring the employee to prove that the injury was wholly caused by the risks of employment. However, the Constitution requires only that the injury was caused in part by the risks of employment. Thus, the court concluded that the statutes impermissibly restricted legal causation.
The court also addressed an argument that Legislature is empowered to restrict recovery where drugs and alcohol are involved because the injury must be caused by a “necessary risk or danger of such employment.” Quoting the Court of Appeals panel in Grammatico below, the Supreme Court declared that “such a definition of ‘a necessary risk or danger of . . . employment,’ would impermissibly ‘inject[] fault into the no-fault workers’ compensation system and effectively abrogate[] claims for injuries partially caused or contributed to by workplace dangers.’”
Justice Ryan wrote the opinion for the court.
Posted by azapp @ Fri, Aug 12, 2005
