AZAPP is a blog that provides a thorough, up-to-date, and efficient resource to stay abreast of significant developments concerning civil cases in Arizona's appellate courts - the two Divisions of the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Justice Berch, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated a Court of Appeals opinion , which was the subject of a previous post, that found that the Arizona Democratic Party violated A.R.S. § 16-919 by accepting approximately $100,000 in donations from corporations and labor unions to pay the Party’s general operating expenses. Focusing on the plain language of A.R.S. § 16-919, Justice Berch wrote: “[T]he State seems to have brought this action against the wrong party.”
Section 16-919 prohibits a corporation, LLC, or labor organization from making “any contribution of money or anything of value for the purpose of influencing an election.” The statute further prohibits a candidate, the candidate’s campaign committee or exploratory committee, and designating individuals from accepting corporate contributions. The Court held that nothing in the statute prohibits a political party from accepting corporate contributions to pay overhead expenses. The Court noted that Section 16-907 prevents political parties from accepting “earmarked” contributions, but found that the contributions at issue were not “earmarked.”
Vice Chief Justice Berch authored the opinion; Justices McGregor, Ryan, Hurwitz, and Jones (Retired) concurred.
Posted date: Tue, Jul 12, 2005
A.R.S. § 25-503(H) provides, in part, that "[u]nless it is reduced to a written money judgment, an unpaid child support judgment that became a judgment by operation of law expires three years after the emancipation of the last remaining unemancipated child who was included in the court order." Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) sought to administratively collect arrearages from Jack Hayden that had not been reduced to a written money judgment and that were older than three years after Hayden's child was emancipated. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion, which was the subject of a previous post, relied on the distinction between a judgment and a debt and concluded that, although the judgment had expired, the underlying obligation remained.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed noting that "[a] commonsense reading of A.R.S. § 25-503(H) and related statutory provisions supports Hayden’s interpretation." The court observed that the statutory scheme had been amended in 1999 and provisions that previously referenced a time limit for "filing an action" had been removed. Thus, the court held that A.R.S. § 25-503(H) did not merely create a statute of limitations for pursuing judicial action, but rather terminated the underlying obligation. ADES was not permitted to pursue administrative collection of the arrearages.
Justice Hurwitz wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
Fillmore, an independent contractor forASK/H20, brought suit against Maricopa Water Processing Systems (“MWPS”) and its employee, Owen, for injurious falsehood, tortious business interference, and defamation. Fillmore alleged that during a sales visit to one of Fillmore’s potential clients Owen made several pejorative statements about ASK/H20’s products and business practices. MWPS and Owen moved to dismiss, alleging that Fillmore lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of ASK/H20. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Fillmore had failed to state a claim for relief, and awarded attorneys’ fees to MWPS and Owen. This appeal followed.
Judge Ehrlich, writing for a unanimous panel, found that the Anti-Abrogation Clause of the Arizona Constitution, Art. XVIII, § 6, offered strong constitutional protections of the right to bring common-law tort claims and that—because he was seeking recovery for his own losses—Fillmore had standing to sue. The court concluded that Fillmore’s complaint stated valid causes of action for injurious falsehood, tortious business interference, and defamation. The court found that all three claims could be brought for the same tortious conduct and that there was no absolute privilege barring any of the claims. The court further concluded Fillmore’s allegations satisfied the requirement of respondeat superior and that MWPS could be held vicariously liable. The court vacated the award of fees and denied MWPS and Owen’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees.
Judge Ehrlich authored the opinion; Judges Snow and Gemmill concurred.
A general contractor solicited bids from subcontractors for the construction of a Home Depot store in Mesa. An exterior-insulation subcontractor faxed a bid to the general contractor identifying its price and stating “Our price is good for 30 days.” The general contractor used the subcontractor’s bid in calculating its own bid, which was successful. When the general contractor (within the 30-day “price is good” period) sent a contract to the subcontractor, however, the subcontractor refused to sign it, explaining that it had become too busy. The general contractor found another subcontractor, who charged a higher price, and then sued the subcontractor for the difference, claiming promissory estoppel. After a bench trial, the court ruled for the general contractor and awarded the difference as damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court first noted that, because neither party had asked the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the trial court had not sua sponte issued detailed findings, the court would “presume that the trial court found every fact necessary to support its judgment and [would] affirm if any reasonable construction of the evidence justifies it.” The court rejected the subcontractor’s argument that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply to subcontractors that submit bids to general contractors, and found that this standard was satisfied, finding that the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to conclude (1) that the subcontractor made a promise, (2) that the subcontractor should have reasonably foreseen that the general contractor would rely on that promise, (3) that the general contractor did in fact rely on that promise, (4) that the general contractor had a “justifiable right to rely” on that promise, and (5) that injustice could be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Addressing the subcontractor’s argument that the claim was barred by the statute of frauds, the court noted that Arizona courts had not decided whether the pertinent portion of the statute of frauds (which refers to contracts for the sale of goods) applies to a subcontract that contemplates the provision of both goods and services. The court surveyed other jurisdictions’ holdings applying similar statutes, noting that other courts had found statute of frauds provisions inapplicable if the “predominant aspect and purpose” of the contract in question was the provision of services, rather than the sale of goods. Finding that the record supported the conclusion that the contract in question was predominantly for the provision of services, the court held that the trial court could properly have concluded that the statute of frauds did not apply. The court accordingly affirmed the damage award.
The general contractor cross-appealed from the denial of its request for attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the denial of fees, noting that “[p]romissory estoppel provides an equitable remedy and is not a theory of contract liability,” and thus did not fall within A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).
The opinion was authored by Judge Gemmill and joined by Judges Barker and Norris.
Article: Paper Can't Be Sued for Printing Letter, Top Court Rules
(See Citizen Publishing v. Superior Court below)
Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller: Supreme Court Holds That the First Amendment Protects a Newspaper From Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress for Printing a Letter to the Editor About the War in Iraq
Plaintiffs Elleithee and Wali Yudeen S. Abduhl Rahim sued the Tucson Citizen for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault in connection with a letter the Citizen published in the Op-Ed. section about the war in Iraq. The letter stated, in part, that “[w]henever there is an assassination or another atrocity we should proceed to the closest mosque and execute five of the first Muslims we encounter.” The Citizen moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Superior Court dismissed the assault claim, but declined to dismiss the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the letter could rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous conduct” needed to establish the tort.
The Supreme Court held that assuming the complaint stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the claim should have been dismissed because the speech was protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court found that the letter constituted political speech about matters of public concern – the war in Iraq. Accordingly, to be subject to tort liability, the speech must fall within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argued that the speech was not protected because it: (1) could “incite imminent lawless action,” (2) constituted “fighting words,” or (3) was a “true threat.” The Court found that the speech did not fall within these “exceptions to the general rule of First Amendment protection,” focusing on the fact that the letter appeared in a newspaper editorial page, rather than before an angry mob or in the context of “a face to face confrontation with the target of the remarks.” The Court also observed that “[t]he suggestion that ‘we’ execute Muslims was premised on the occurrence of some future ‘assassination or another atrocity,’” and that the letter is unclear as to whom “we” refers – the United States armed forces or the public at large.
Justice Hurwitz authored the Court’s unanimous decision.
PRACTICE NOTE: The Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s decision to not grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to a special action petition. It notes that such review is unusual, but that “[i]n cases in which an appellate court can determine from the pleadings a case-dispositive First Amendment defense, special action review of the trial court’s refusal to grant a motion to dismiss may be appropriate.”
Article: O'Connor Ex-Clerks Surprised By Move
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's former clerks are surprised by her retirement and still keep in touch with her.
Arizona Supreme Court Issues Minutes; Grants No Petitions or Special Actions
The Arizona Supreme Court issued its Minutes in two parts, Part A and Part B. The Court granted no Petitions for Review and accepted jurisdiction in no Special Actions. The Court declined review of 4 Special Action petitions, denied 31 Petitions for Review, and continued ruling on 33 Petitions for Review.
