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Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Wenc v. Sierra Vista Unified School Dist.: Division Two Declines to Set Aside School District Budget Override Election Even Though It Was Canvassed by an Unauthorized County Employee.
The Sierra Vista Unified School District held a budget override election pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-481. The canvass of returns was to be conducted by the Chairman of the County Board of Supervisors and the Cochise County School Superintendent. The Superintendent appointed her administrative assistant to act on her behalf, which the Superintendent was authorized to do under A.R.S. § 38-462(A). She failed, however, to put the appointment in writing and record it with the county recorder, as required by A.R.S. § 38-461(C).
The trial court construed § 38-462 as a provision that eliminated the technical requirements for appointing a deputy except in those rare cases in which the official sought to appoint a non-employee to perform a specific task. Judge Eckerstrom, writing for a unanimous panel, disagreed and held that the procedural requirements of § 38-461 must be followed. Consequently, the administrative assistant did not have the legal authority to conduct the canvass on the Superintendent’s behalf. Nevertheless, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment, finding that the election results were reliable and reflected the intent of the voters. Because § 15-481 did not demand strict compliance with the procedures for conducting those elections, the court rejected appellant’s request to void the canvass or the election due to the Superintendent’s oversight.
The Sierra Vista Unified School District held a budget override election pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-481. The canvass of returns was to be conducted by the Chairman of the County Board of Supervisors and the Cochise County School Superintendent. The Superintendent appointed her administrative assistant to act on her behalf, which the Superintendent was authorized to do under A.R.S. § 38-462(A). She failed, however, to put the appointment in writing and record it with the county recorder, as required by A.R.S. § 38-461(C).
The trial court construed § 38-462 as a provision that eliminated the technical requirements for appointing a deputy except in those rare cases in which the official sought to appoint a non-employee to perform a specific task. Judge Eckerstrom, writing for a unanimous panel, disagreed and held that the procedural requirements of § 38-461 must be followed. Consequently, the administrative assistant did not have the legal authority to conduct the canvass on the Superintendent’s behalf. Nevertheless, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment, finding that the election results were reliable and reflected the intent of the voters. Because § 15-481 did not demand strict compliance with the procedures for conducting those elections, the court rejected appellant’s request to void the canvass or the election due to the Superintendent’s oversight.
Judge Eckerstrom wrote the opinion; Judges Howard and Espinosa joined.
Posted date: Tue, Mar 29, 2005
Monday, March 28, 2005
Smethers v. Campion, et. al.: Arizona Court of Appeals holds that exclusion of evidence of a medical expert’s personal practices in a medical malpractice case was reversible error.
This medical malpractice case arises out of an unsuccessful LASIK eye surgery, a type of corrective eye surgery intended to result in clearer vision. In October of 1999, the plaintiff, Dr. Gary Smethers, consulted Defendant Dr. Michael Campion at Southwestern Eye Center to assess his candidacy for LASIK surgery. Dr. Campion measured plaintiff’s cornea at that time, in preparation for the procedure scheduled the following month. Because an accurate measurement of the cornea is imperative to successful LASIK surgery, and wearing contact lenses affects the shape of the cornea, Dr. Campion instructed plaintiff to remove his contact lenses for several days before the scheduled surgery to allow his cornea to resume its natural shape, which plaintiff did. Dr. Campion did not re-measure plaintiff’s cornea immediately prior to surgery, relying instead on past measurements. Far from improving plaintiff’s eyesight, the surgery resulted in an “over-correction,” deteriorating plaintiff’s vision and causing a variety of problems that could not be cured by further corrective surgery. The central issue at trial focused on whether Dr. Campion had exercised the relevant standard of care when he failed to re-measure plaintiff’s cornea on the day of the surgery. In the resulting “battle of the experts,” Dr. Campion retained Dr. Perry Binder, who testified during his deposition that Dr. Campion’s decision to rely on past measurement records as opposed to re-measuring plaintiffs eyes immediately prior to surgery did not breach the standard of care, but that, in his own practice, he would have re-measured before proceeding with the surgery. Defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the evidence of Dr. Binder’s personal practices at trial, which the trial court granted. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Dr. Campion.
On appeal, Dr. Smethers argued that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence of Dr. Binder’s personal practices. Considering the issue, the Court of Appeals determined that it was not necessary to articulate a per se rule regarding the admissibility of the personal practices of medical experts, because, in this case, other evidence in the record (including Dr. Binders’ trial testimony and medical literature) suggested that the applicable standard of care was closer to Dr. Binders’ personal practice than his official expert opinion, and that Dr. Binders’ deposition testimony should have been admitted to impeach Dr. Binder and allow the jury to assess his credibility on that issue. The Court accordingly reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial.
Opinion by Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Judge Susan A. Earlich, and Judge Pro Tempore George H. Foster concurring.
This medical malpractice case arises out of an unsuccessful LASIK eye surgery, a type of corrective eye surgery intended to result in clearer vision. In October of 1999, the plaintiff, Dr. Gary Smethers, consulted Defendant Dr. Michael Campion at Southwestern Eye Center to assess his candidacy for LASIK surgery. Dr. Campion measured plaintiff’s cornea at that time, in preparation for the procedure scheduled the following month. Because an accurate measurement of the cornea is imperative to successful LASIK surgery, and wearing contact lenses affects the shape of the cornea, Dr. Campion instructed plaintiff to remove his contact lenses for several days before the scheduled surgery to allow his cornea to resume its natural shape, which plaintiff did. Dr. Campion did not re-measure plaintiff’s cornea immediately prior to surgery, relying instead on past measurements. Far from improving plaintiff’s eyesight, the surgery resulted in an “over-correction,” deteriorating plaintiff’s vision and causing a variety of problems that could not be cured by further corrective surgery. The central issue at trial focused on whether Dr. Campion had exercised the relevant standard of care when he failed to re-measure plaintiff’s cornea on the day of the surgery. In the resulting “battle of the experts,” Dr. Campion retained Dr. Perry Binder, who testified during his deposition that Dr. Campion’s decision to rely on past measurement records as opposed to re-measuring plaintiffs eyes immediately prior to surgery did not breach the standard of care, but that, in his own practice, he would have re-measured before proceeding with the surgery. Defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the evidence of Dr. Binder’s personal practices at trial, which the trial court granted. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Dr. Campion.
On appeal, Dr. Smethers argued that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence of Dr. Binder’s personal practices. Considering the issue, the Court of Appeals determined that it was not necessary to articulate a per se rule regarding the admissibility of the personal practices of medical experts, because, in this case, other evidence in the record (including Dr. Binders’ trial testimony and medical literature) suggested that the applicable standard of care was closer to Dr. Binders’ personal practice than his official expert opinion, and that Dr. Binders’ deposition testimony should have been admitted to impeach Dr. Binder and allow the jury to assess his credibility on that issue. The Court accordingly reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial.
Opinion by Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop, Judge Susan A. Earlich, and Judge Pro Tempore George H. Foster concurring.
Posted date: Mon, Mar 28, 2005
Friday, March 25, 2005
Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc.: Supreme Court Holds That a Plaintiff Cannot Pursue a Class Action Claim Against a Defendant in the Absence of an Individual Claim
Eleanora Fernandez brought a class action lawsuit against a number of defendants, including several automobile manufacturers who allegedly installed defective seatbelts in their vehicles. With respect to four of the manufacturers, she alleged no injury “fairly traceable” to their conduct. In light of this, the Court held that Fernandez lacked standing to pursue any individual claims against these manufacturers. Moreover, the Court held that if a plaintiff does not have “an individual claim against the defendant,” the plaintiff “cannot maintain a class action against that defendant.” The Court rejected Fernandez’s request to nevertheless permit her class action claims to proceed under the “judicial link” doctrine. The “judicial link” doctrine, the Court explained, generally allows a plaintiff to join in one action all defendants who took part in a similar scheme that was sustained either by a contract or conspiracy, or pursuant to uniform state rule. Thus, the Court explained, even if it were to adopt the judicial link doctrine, it would not confer standing on Fernandez under the circumstances of this case. The Court further rejected any suggestion that this case involved any of the highly unusual circumstances that would warrant waiving the normal standing requirements.
Justice Ryan wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
Eleanora Fernandez brought a class action lawsuit against a number of defendants, including several automobile manufacturers who allegedly installed defective seatbelts in their vehicles. With respect to four of the manufacturers, she alleged no injury “fairly traceable” to their conduct. In light of this, the Court held that Fernandez lacked standing to pursue any individual claims against these manufacturers. Moreover, the Court held that if a plaintiff does not have “an individual claim against the defendant,” the plaintiff “cannot maintain a class action against that defendant.” The Court rejected Fernandez’s request to nevertheless permit her class action claims to proceed under the “judicial link” doctrine. The “judicial link” doctrine, the Court explained, generally allows a plaintiff to join in one action all defendants who took part in a similar scheme that was sustained either by a contract or conspiracy, or pursuant to uniform state rule. Thus, the Court explained, even if it were to adopt the judicial link doctrine, it would not confer standing on Fernandez under the circumstances of this case. The Court further rejected any suggestion that this case involved any of the highly unusual circumstances that would warrant waiving the normal standing requirements.
Justice Ryan wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
Posted date: Fri, Mar 25, 2005
Sunday, March 20, 2005
Summaries of Cases to be Argued Before the Arizona Supreme Court March 24 and 28
The Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorney's Office has issued summaries of the cases to be argued before the Court on March 24 and March 28. The summaries are for educational purposes only, and should not be considered official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court. On Thursday, March 24, the Court will hear argument in two cases: (1) Citizen Publishing v. Pima County Superior Court, involving the question of whether the trial court violated federal and/or Arizona free speech protections by refusing to dismiss an emotional distress claim based on the defendant newspaper's publication of a letter advocating violence against Muslims, and (2) State v. Glassel, an automatic appeal from a death sentence in which the defendant raises mental competency and a number of other issues. On Monday, March 28, the Court will hear argument in two cases: (1) Canion v. Cole, involving the question of whether and to what extent the State's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence applies in post-conviction relief proceedings, and (2) State v. Martinez, involving the question of whether a criminal defendant has a right to have the jury find every aggravating fact upon which the judge relies in fixing his sentence.
The Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorney's Office has issued summaries of the cases to be argued before the Court on March 24 and March 28. The summaries are for educational purposes only, and should not be considered official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court. On Thursday, March 24, the Court will hear argument in two cases: (1) Citizen Publishing v. Pima County Superior Court, involving the question of whether the trial court violated federal and/or Arizona free speech protections by refusing to dismiss an emotional distress claim based on the defendant newspaper's publication of a letter advocating violence against Muslims, and (2) State v. Glassel, an automatic appeal from a death sentence in which the defendant raises mental competency and a number of other issues. On Monday, March 28, the Court will hear argument in two cases: (1) Canion v. Cole, involving the question of whether and to what extent the State's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence applies in post-conviction relief proceedings, and (2) State v. Martinez, involving the question of whether a criminal defendant has a right to have the jury find every aggravating fact upon which the judge relies in fixing his sentence.
Posted date: Sun, Mar 20, 2005
Articles: Lemon Law Case, Priest-Penitent Privilege Case
An article on azcentral.com discusses Division One's decision in the Lemon-Law case, which was the subject of a recent posting. Another article discusses the priest-penitent privilege issue involved in the Korri Waters (criminal) case.
An article on azcentral.com discusses Division One's decision in the Lemon-Law case, which was the subject of a recent posting. Another article discusses the priest-penitent privilege issue involved in the Korri Waters (criminal) case.
Posted date: Sun, Mar 20, 2005
Monday, March 14, 2005
Espinoza v. Schulenburg: Division One Permits Application of Rescue Doctrine to Off-Duty Firefighter Rescuer.
Elizabeth Espinoza, an off-duty Phoenix firefighter and EMT was driving home from work with her daughter when she stopped to give assistance to the Schulenburgs, who were involved in a car accident. While giving assistance, Espinoza was injured when another driver struck the Schulenburg car. Espinoza sued the Schulenburgs, the driver of the second car and the Department of Public Safety for negligence. The Schulenburgs moved for summary judgment arguing that Espinoza's recovery was precluded by the fireman's rule. The trial court agreed and dismissed all claims against the Schulenburgs.
In an appeal involving the intersection of the fireman's rule with the rescue doctrine, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the fireman's rule does not operate to preclude recovery when the firefighter or law-enforcement agent acts in a truly volunteer capacity.
The rescue doctrine holds that an injured rescuer can recover damages from the original tortfeasor who negligently caused the event precipitating the rescue, even if there is an intervening act of negligence by another. The fireman's rule essentially removes a professional firefighter or police officer injured while performing official duties from the class of rescuers protected by the rescue doctrine. The Court of Appeals found that the justifications for the fireman's rule, which include expectation of encountering hazards on the job and rendering aid because the professional is paid to do so, should not apply when a professional acts in a volunteer capacity. The Court acknowledged a caveat: the rescuer must act in a truly volunteer capacity. Consistent with logic and fairness, the Court essentially acknowledged that off-duty firefighters and other law-enforcement professionals are like ordinary civilian volunteers. Because Espinoza was off-duty, she was entitled to the benefit of the rescue doctrine. As the party seeking the benefit of the fireman's rule, the burden was on the Schulenburgs to demonstrate that Espinoza was required by her employee to respond in an emergency situation. The Court remanded to permit the Schulenburgs to pursue further discovery to determine whether such a mandate existed.
Presiding Judge Sult authored the opinion; Judges Norris and Orozco concurred.
Elizabeth Espinoza, an off-duty Phoenix firefighter and EMT was driving home from work with her daughter when she stopped to give assistance to the Schulenburgs, who were involved in a car accident. While giving assistance, Espinoza was injured when another driver struck the Schulenburg car. Espinoza sued the Schulenburgs, the driver of the second car and the Department of Public Safety for negligence. The Schulenburgs moved for summary judgment arguing that Espinoza's recovery was precluded by the fireman's rule. The trial court agreed and dismissed all claims against the Schulenburgs.
In an appeal involving the intersection of the fireman's rule with the rescue doctrine, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the fireman's rule does not operate to preclude recovery when the firefighter or law-enforcement agent acts in a truly volunteer capacity.
The rescue doctrine holds that an injured rescuer can recover damages from the original tortfeasor who negligently caused the event precipitating the rescue, even if there is an intervening act of negligence by another. The fireman's rule essentially removes a professional firefighter or police officer injured while performing official duties from the class of rescuers protected by the rescue doctrine. The Court of Appeals found that the justifications for the fireman's rule, which include expectation of encountering hazards on the job and rendering aid because the professional is paid to do so, should not apply when a professional acts in a volunteer capacity. The Court acknowledged a caveat: the rescuer must act in a truly volunteer capacity. Consistent with logic and fairness, the Court essentially acknowledged that off-duty firefighters and other law-enforcement professionals are like ordinary civilian volunteers. Because Espinoza was off-duty, she was entitled to the benefit of the rescue doctrine. As the party seeking the benefit of the fireman's rule, the burden was on the Schulenburgs to demonstrate that Espinoza was required by her employee to respond in an emergency situation. The Court remanded to permit the Schulenburgs to pursue further discovery to determine whether such a mandate existed.
Presiding Judge Sult authored the opinion; Judges Norris and Orozco concurred.
Posted date: Mon, Mar 14, 2005
Friday, March 4, 2005
Hutto v. Francisco: Division One Holds that Vehicle Owner May Bear Tort Liability for Death Arising from Absence of Seatbelt
Defendants bought a 1971 Chevrolet pickup truck in 1999. Although the truck originally had seatbelts, they had been removed by the time defendants bought the truck, and defendants did not replace them. Plaintiff's son was killed in a crash in which he was thrown from the truck. Plaintiff then sued defendants, alleging that their negligence in failing to replace the seatbelts was to blame. Defendants initially moved for summary judgment on federal preemption grounds, but the motion was denied. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on the ground that they had no duty to reinstall the seatbelts, and the court granted their motion. Plaintiff appealed, and defendants cross-appealed the denial of their first summary judgment motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court first addressed and rejected defendants' preemption argument. The Court found no indication of express statutory preemption, and in fact found evidence that Congress did not intend for the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to preempt tort actions, citing 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) ("Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law."). The Court found no "field" or "implied" preemption, concluding that federal safety regulations "does not occupy the field of tort liability among individuals who are owners or operators of vehicles or passengers in them." And the Court found no conflict between federal statutes requiring manufacturers to install seatbelts and the imposition of tort liability on individuals who fail to replace seatbelts. The Court then turned to the viability of plaintiff's tort claim. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants were negligent per se based on the language of A.R.S. 28-921(A)(1)(a), holding that this statute "does not create a sufficiently specific standard by which conduct is to be measured" to be a basis for negligence per se. Under the common law standard, however, the Court held that plaintiff had established a triable question of fact that should have been left to the jury. Noting that the importance of seatbelts in preventing death and avoiding injury is "beyond doubt," the Court concluded that it "[could not] say as a matter of law that it is unreasonable to expect an owner to maintain the original safety equipment in the vehicle installed by the manufacturer, or that the risk posed by the absence of such equipment is one that motorists or passengers should reasonably bear."
The opinion was authored by Judge Lankford and joined by Judges Gemmill and Sult.
Defendants bought a 1971 Chevrolet pickup truck in 1999. Although the truck originally had seatbelts, they had been removed by the time defendants bought the truck, and defendants did not replace them. Plaintiff's son was killed in a crash in which he was thrown from the truck. Plaintiff then sued defendants, alleging that their negligence in failing to replace the seatbelts was to blame. Defendants initially moved for summary judgment on federal preemption grounds, but the motion was denied. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on the ground that they had no duty to reinstall the seatbelts, and the court granted their motion. Plaintiff appealed, and defendants cross-appealed the denial of their first summary judgment motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court first addressed and rejected defendants' preemption argument. The Court found no indication of express statutory preemption, and in fact found evidence that Congress did not intend for the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to preempt tort actions, citing 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) ("Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law."). The Court found no "field" or "implied" preemption, concluding that federal safety regulations "does not occupy the field of tort liability among individuals who are owners or operators of vehicles or passengers in them." And the Court found no conflict between federal statutes requiring manufacturers to install seatbelts and the imposition of tort liability on individuals who fail to replace seatbelts. The Court then turned to the viability of plaintiff's tort claim. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants were negligent per se based on the language of A.R.S. 28-921(A)(1)(a), holding that this statute "does not create a sufficiently specific standard by which conduct is to be measured" to be a basis for negligence per se. Under the common law standard, however, the Court held that plaintiff had established a triable question of fact that should have been left to the jury. Noting that the importance of seatbelts in preventing death and avoiding injury is "beyond doubt," the Court concluded that it "[could not] say as a matter of law that it is unreasonable to expect an owner to maintain the original safety equipment in the vehicle installed by the manufacturer, or that the risk posed by the absence of such equipment is one that motorists or passengers should reasonably bear."
The opinion was authored by Judge Lankford and joined by Judges Gemmill and Sult.
Tonto Apache Tribe Creates Appellate Court
The Tonto Apache Tribe has created its first appellate court and appointed Hon. Thomas Zlaket, former Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court; Hon. Jesse Filkins, former Maricopa County Superior Court Judge; and former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Hon. Kevin Gover to the court. According to an article in the Payson Roundup, the panel will begin hearing appeals in November.
The Tonto Apache Tribe has created its first appellate court and appointed Hon. Thomas Zlaket, former Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court; Hon. Jesse Filkins, former Maricopa County Superior Court Judge; and former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Hon. Kevin Gover to the court. According to an article in the Payson Roundup, the panel will begin hearing appeals in November.
Article on Munninger Decision
An article on azcentral.com discusses Division One's recent decision in State v. Munninger, a criminal appeal involving the reversal of a conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds.
An article on azcentral.com discusses Division One's recent decision in State v. Munninger, a criminal appeal involving the reversal of a conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds.
Thursday, March 3, 2005
Articles: Reversal of Child-Molestation Convictions, Petition for Review of Murder Conviction, AG Letter Addressing Racial-Profiling Issue
An article appearing on azcentral.com reports that the Arizona Court of Appeals has reversed the child-molestation convictions of former Catholic-school teacher Phillip Gregory Speers. Another article reports that a petition for review of the conviction of Eric Clark argues that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the crime and should have been found guilty but insane. In a letter to the editor, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard responds to coverage of an Arizona Supreme Court argument discussed in a previous posting, stressing that he does not condone racial profiling by law-enforcement officers.
An article appearing on azcentral.com reports that the Arizona Court of Appeals has reversed the child-molestation convictions of former Catholic-school teacher Phillip Gregory Speers. Another article reports that a petition for review of the conviction of Eric Clark argues that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the crime and should have been found guilty but insane. In a letter to the editor, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard responds to coverage of an Arizona Supreme Court argument discussed in a previous posting, stressing that he does not condone racial profiling by law-enforcement officers.
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.: Division One Holds Lessee is a Consumer under Magnuson-Moss Act and Under Arizona Lemon Law
Parrot leased a Jeep with thirty miles on it from an Arizona Jeep dealer. The lease provided that the Jeep was covered by the manufacturer's new vehicle warranty. The Jeep developed a host of problems that required multiple visits to the dealer for service. The dealer was unable to fix the problems and Parrot eventually returned the Jeep to the dealer. Parrot sued in Superior Court under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301 and under Arizona's Lemon Law, A.R.S. 44-1262. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler on both claims. Parrot appealed.
The Court of Appeals first held that Parrot was a "consumer" under the Magnuson-Moss Act even though he did not have title to the Jeep. The Court reasoned that Parrot met two of the three tests set forth by the Act because the Jeep was physically transferred to him during the term of its warranty (prong two) and because the terms of the warranty entitle him to enforce it against the warrantor (prong three). Rejecting DaimlerChrysler's argument that Parrot was not a "prong three" consumer because he had never been expressly assigned warranty rights, the Court held that Arizona law finds an assignment where the requirements of a valid contract are met. Citing Certified Collectors, Inc. v. Lesnick, 116 Ariz. 601, 603 (1977). Here, the Court found these requirements were satisfied by the terms and circumstances of Parrot's lease. The Court reversed the Superior Court's summary judgment on the Magnuson-Moss claim.
The Court of Appeals then addressed Parrot's state law claim. First, the Court held that the Lemon Law mirrors the Magnuson Moss Act, differing only in that: the Lemon Law applies only to motor vehicles, the Lemon Law applies only to express warranties, and the Lemon Law includes no definition of "written warranty." The Court then relied on its analysis of the federal law claim to reverse the summary judgment on the state law claim.
The Opinion was written by Judge Ehrlich, joined by Judge Winthrop, and Judge Pro Tempore Foster (Maricopa County Superior Court).
Parrot leased a Jeep with thirty miles on it from an Arizona Jeep dealer. The lease provided that the Jeep was covered by the manufacturer's new vehicle warranty. The Jeep developed a host of problems that required multiple visits to the dealer for service. The dealer was unable to fix the problems and Parrot eventually returned the Jeep to the dealer. Parrot sued in Superior Court under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301 and under Arizona's Lemon Law, A.R.S. 44-1262. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler on both claims. Parrot appealed.
The Court of Appeals first held that Parrot was a "consumer" under the Magnuson-Moss Act even though he did not have title to the Jeep. The Court reasoned that Parrot met two of the three tests set forth by the Act because the Jeep was physically transferred to him during the term of its warranty (prong two) and because the terms of the warranty entitle him to enforce it against the warrantor (prong three). Rejecting DaimlerChrysler's argument that Parrot was not a "prong three" consumer because he had never been expressly assigned warranty rights, the Court held that Arizona law finds an assignment where the requirements of a valid contract are met. Citing Certified Collectors, Inc. v. Lesnick, 116 Ariz. 601, 603 (1977). Here, the Court found these requirements were satisfied by the terms and circumstances of Parrot's lease. The Court reversed the Superior Court's summary judgment on the Magnuson-Moss claim.
The Court of Appeals then addressed Parrot's state law claim. First, the Court held that the Lemon Law mirrors the Magnuson Moss Act, differing only in that: the Lemon Law applies only to motor vehicles, the Lemon Law applies only to express warranties, and the Lemon Law includes no definition of "written warranty." The Court then relied on its analysis of the federal law claim to reverse the summary judgment on the state law claim.
The Opinion was written by Judge Ehrlich, joined by Judge Winthrop, and Judge Pro Tempore Foster (Maricopa County Superior Court).
