AZAPP Blog

Stop Exploiting Taxpayers v. Barbara Jones: Division One Holds that Municipal Ordinances Setting Utility Rates are Administrative Acts Not Subject to Referendum

The Mesa City Council adopted ordinances adjusting the City’s water, wastewater, gas, and solid waste utility rates. Political committee Stop Exploiting Taxpayers (“SET”) filed an application to have the ordinances placed on a referendum in the next city election. The Mesa City Attorney notified SET that the City took the position that the ordinances were administrative acts not subject to referendum. SET in turn filed a special action seeking an order compelling the City to place the ordinances on a referendum. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Division One affirmed. The Court first noted that, although the utility rates in question were no longer in effect, it would take jurisdiction to review the appeal because the issue in question was of great public importance and was “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Turning to the merits, the Court observed that only legislative acts, and not executive or administrative acts, are subject to the constitutional right of referendum. Legislative acts “generally relate to subjects of a permanent and general character which prescribe new policies and plans,” whereas administrative acts are “generally temporary, specific in subject matter, and intended to execute existing policies or plans.” The Court concluded that the ordinances fell in the latter category, because they enumerated specific rate schedules applicable to specific utility services, had no effect on the underlying statutes and ordinances through which the City owned and operated its utilities, and were considered annually as part of the City’s budget process. The Court rejected SET’s argument that the ordinances were legislative because they were intended to raise revenue for general purposes, and likewise rejected SET’s attempts to draw support from the City’s Charter and caselaw.

The opinion was authored by Judge Orozco and joined by Judges Timmer and Gemmill.

Posted by azapp @ Thu, Dec 29, 2005

Article: State Board Votes Against Fighting Order In English-Learning Case

Associated Press article re-printed in the Arizona Republic on azcentral.com
Dec. 27, 2005

The state Board of Education voted Tuesday against fighting a federal judge's order that requires Arizona to improve programs for students learning the English language.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Article: Rep. Smith Continues To Appeal Ouster Order
Expects To Serve Full Session In State House

Thomas Ropp The Arizona Republic
azcentral.com
Dec. 26, 2005

CAREFREE - Despite recent court rulings against him, state Rep. David Burnell Smith said he expects to be part of the next legislative session from start to finish.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Article: Web Host Not Liable In Defamation Case

Paul Davenport Associated Press
Re-Printed in the Arizona Republic @ azcentral.com
Dec. 23, 2005

The operator of a travel business based on the Indonesian resort island of Bali can't use Arizona courts to sue another business there for posting allegedly defamatory information on a Web site hosted by a Phoenix company. See Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting listed below.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Article: Judge Gives Arizona Education Ultimatum

The Arizona Republic Dec. 17, 2005

An article in the Arizona Republic reports that U.S. District Judge Raner Collins ordered lawmakers and Gov. Janet Napolitano to aid English learners or face big fines.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting: Division One Holds That Federal Communications Decency Act Bars Defamation Suit Against Internet Website Hosting Company; Rejects Claim of Personal Jurisdiction Over Bali Resident.

CrystalTech Web Hosting, an Arizona corporation, provides Internet website services for Bali Discovery Tours, a travel-related business operated by Bali resident John M. Daniels. Mark A. Austin, the operator of a competitor business in Bali, sued Daniels and CrystalTech for defamation and related state tort claims after an article on the Bali Discovery Tours website alleged that Bali officials were going to file criminal charges against Austin.

The superior court granted summary judgment for CrystalTech, holding that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) gave the Internet website hosting company immunity from Austin’s state tort claims. The superior court dismissed the claims against Daniels because he did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona for the court to exert personal jurisdiction. Austin appealed both rulings.

Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed as to both defendants. Citing Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the court held that the relevant provision of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), immunized both publishers and distributors of Internet-based information from liability for defamatory content provided by others.

For its personal jurisdiction analysis, the court assumed, without deciding, that Daniels had purposefully availed himself of the laws of Arizona, and that the claim arose out of those contacts. The court held, however, that it would be unreasonable to exert jurisdiction over Daniels because neither Daniels nor Austin is an Arizona resident, neither one lives here, and the state has no interest either in resolving a dispute between two Bali travel-related competitors, or in the substantive law of Indonesia, which would govern the dispute.

Judge Portley wrote the opinion; Judges Irvine and Gemmill concurred.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Maher v. Urman: Division Two holds that the 1996 amendment to Rule 4(i) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to extend the time for service without a showing of good cause, but separately mandates an extension if good cause is shown.

On June 22, 2004, Steven Maher filed a complaint against his former attorneys, alleging they had negligently represented him in a securities matter and had breached the contract of representation. A summons was issued the same day Maher filed his complaint, but he failed to serve any of the defendants by September 24, 2004, when the trial court’s calendar services department issued a notice of impending dismissal. The notice informed Maher that his action would be dismissed without prejudice 30 days from the notice date. On October 22, 2004, Maher filed a request to extend his time to serve the defendant, which the court denied on October 25, finding no good cause for extension. Maher ultimately served the defendants on October 29, 2004, and Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to serve in a timely fashion. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and Maher appealed.

On appeal, Maher contended that the trial court misinterpreted Rule 4(i), Ariz. R. Civ. P. and abused its discretion by finding he had not shown “good cause” or “extenuating circumstances” to extend time for service. Maher asserted that the 1996 amendment to Rule 4(i) permits a trial court to extend time for service without a showing of good cause. The Court of Appeals agreed and disapproved of dicta from Toy v. Katz, 192 Ariz. 73, 82 n.1, 961 P.2d 1021, 1030 n.1 (App. 1997), wherein Division One had stated that the 1996 amendment did not change the substance of the rule. Rule 4(i) was amended to bring it into conformity with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been amended in 1993. Prior to the 1993 federal amendment, the Arizona and federal rules had been identical, following Arizona’s 1996 amendment, the rules were once again identical. Thus, the court of appeals looked to federal case law interpreting the federal analog as instructive for the proper interpretation of Arizona’s rule. Because several federal cases have held that the amended federal rule provides trial court’s with discretion to grant extensions even without a showing of good cause, Division Two determined that Arizona’s amended Rule 4(i) granted similar discretion.

Nonetheless, the court of appeals found nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court was unaware of or disregarded its discretion under Rule 4(i). Because Maher only argued at the trial court that he had shown good cause for an extension, the court below did not address or reject the argument that it had discretion to grant an extension without a showing of good cause. As a result, Maher waived that argument by failing to present it below. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal without prejudice for failure to timely serve the defendants.

Judge Pelander authored the unanimous opinion, which Judge Espinosa and Judge Howard joined.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 28, 2005

Davis v. Zlatos: Division One Clarifies Civil Liability Under the Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”).

Pete Saenz was hired by Myrna Cagney and her husband to care for their ailing mother, Gertrude Zlatos. From February to June, 2000, Mrs. Zlatos wrote checks for more than $23,000.00 to Saenz and conveyed a parcel of property to him. In June of 2000, the Cagneys discovered the loans and the transfer of property. That same month, Mrs. Zlatos was examined by a doctor who found that she was very frail and elderly and had breathing trouble. In November, 2000, Mrs. Zlatos was diagnosed with mild to moderate Alzheimers and was permanently moved to the Alzheimer’s wing of a health center. In January, 2002, the Zlatoses and Cagney sued Saenz in a civil action under the APSA, arguing that Saenz breached his fiduciary duties to the Zlatoses by knowingly depriving an incapacitated or vulnerable adult of her assets or property in violation of the APSA and requested that title to the land be quieted to the Zlatoses. On March 4, 2002, Saenz sold the property to the Davises. After a two day jury trial, the trial court found, among other things, that the Zlatoses had not proven that Mrs. Zlatos was an incapacitated or vulnerable adult under APSA at the time the transactions took place.

On appeal, Division One reversed the trial court and ordered it to quiet title in favor of the Zlatoses’ estate and hold Saenz liable for damages. The Court noted that, to prevail under the APSA (A.R.S. § 46-456) , the plaintiffs were required to prove that Mrs. Zlatos was either incapacitated or vulnerable, not both. Under the statute, a “vulnerable adult” is one that suffers an “impairment.” Applying the ordinary meaning of the word “impairment,” the Court found that Mrs. Zlatos’s physical frailty and inability to walk and her need for constant assistance during her waking hours to accomplish such tasks as bathing, meal preparation, and walking, showed that her ability to care for herself had plainly “lessened” due to her age and health problems, and that Mrs. Zlatos was therefore a vulnerable adult within the meaning of the statute. The Court then concluded that Saenz had violated the APSA because he “failed to act for the benefit of a vulnerable adult to the same extent as a trustee.” See A.R.S. § 46-456(A). There was no dispute that Saenz was a person in Ms. Zlatos’s trust and confidence, and the evidence was clear that Saenz had failed to put Ms. Zlatos’ interests first in the series of transactions, particularly when his own self-interests were involved. At a minimum, Saenz should have advised Ms. Zlatos to seek the advice of a family member or attorney.

Opinion By Judge Irvine, Judges Kessler and Thompson concurring.

Posted by azapp @ Mon, Dec 19, 2005

Arizona v. Granville: Supreme Court Holds That Capital Defendant “Does Not Bear The Burden To Prove By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That The Mitigating Circumstances Are Sufficiently Substantial To Call For Leniency,” But The Defendant Is Not Entitled To A Jury Instruction Stating That, If The Jury Has “A Doubt Whether The Death Penalty Should Be Imposed, [The Jury] Should Resolve That Doubt In Favor Of A Life Sentence.”

Defendant William Baldwin was convicted of first-degree murder. Because the jury found one aggravating factor with respect to the murder, Baldwin was eligible for the death penalty. The State requested that the Superior Court give the following instruction to the jury in its deliberation between a life or death sentence: “The burden of proving the existence of mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency is on the defendant. The defendant must prove the existence of mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence.” The Superior Court refused to give the State’s instruction. To the State’s further objection, the Superior Court gave the following instruction: “If, after carefully considering the evidence, you have a doubt whether the death penalty should be imposed, you should resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence.”

The first jury could not agree that a death sentence was appropriate, and therefore a second jury was impaneled. See A.R.S. § 13-703.01(K). When the Superior Court again refused the State’s instruction and intended to reissue the second instruction, the State filed a special action.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, disapproved the State’s requested instruction. Arizona’s death statutes did not require a capital defendant to prove that the mitigating evidence was “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (E). Citing State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52, 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005) and State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 422, 984 P.2d 16, 30 (1999), the Court noted that the statutes did not create a “presumption of death,” and a jury “may return a verdict of life in prison even if the defendant decides to present no mitigation evidence at all.” The Court further noted that “neither party bears the burden” on the issue; “the jurors must assess whether to impose the death penalty based upon each juror’s individual, qualitative evaluation of the facts of the case, the severity of the aggravating factors, and the quality of any mitigating evidence.” Though some cases have implied that the “mitigating circumstances must ‘outweigh’ aggravating factors for life to be” imposed, the appropriate sentence is “not a fact question to be decided based on the weight of the evidence, but rather is a sentencing decision to be made by each juror based upon the juror’s assessment of the mitigating evidence that the juror has found to exist.” The Court “thus discourage[d]” use of similar “weighing” instructions in capital cases.

The Court, however, specifically disapproved the Superior Court’s instruction that, if the jurors entertained even “a doubt” that death was the appropriate sentence, they must return a life sentence. On appeal, Baldwin conceded that this instruction was improper. The Court agreed, noting that, because the State did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate sentence, it “certainly need not prove that point beyond any doubt whatsoever.”

Justice Berch authored the unanimous opinion.

Posted by azapp @ Thu, Dec 15, 2005

In the Matter of James Joseph Hamm: Supreme Court Refuses Request to Make Arizona First State to Admit a Person Convicted of First-Degree Murder to Bar.

The Arizona Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice McGregor, declined James Hamm's petition for review of the recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness that his application for admission to the State Bar be denied. Hamm pled guilty in 1974 to first-degree murder but had since taken numerous steps toward rehabilitation, including conducting himself as a model prisoner; obtaining, while imprisoned, a bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Northern Arizona University; receiving a commutation from the Governor and an absolute discharge from the Board of Executive Clemency from his conviction for first-degree murder; and obtaining his legal degree and passing the Arizona bar examination.

To demonstrate "good moral character" required for admission to the Bar under Rule 34(a) of the Arizona Rules of Supreme Court, an applicant must demonstrate complete rehabilitation from any past misconduct and present good moral character. The Supreme Court questioned whether Hamm had adequately shown complete rehabilitation and disagreed that he had demonstrated present good moral character.

First, the Court observed that the more serious the prior misconduct of a Bar applicant, the greater the burden on the applicant to demonstrate rehabilitation. The Court, without making an ultimate determination, questioned whether Hamm demonstrated complete rehabilitation in light of his failure to accept responsibility for his actions in the 1974 murder. The Court then held that Hamm's admission was barred by his inability to establish "present good moral character" because Hamm failed to fulfill (or even address) his child support obligations until he began preparing for admission to the Bar, failed to disclose a physical altercation with his current wife as required in his application for admission and appeared to plagiarize a U.S. Supreme Court opinion in his petition for review.

Though the Court was careful not to erect a per se bar to admission of those applicants who have committed serious acts of misconduct, the Court noted that the applicant may not, "in practical terms" be able to make the "extraordinary showing of rehabilitation and present good moral character" necessary for admission.

Chief Justice McGregor wrote for a unanimous court (Justice Berch recused; Judge Lankford was designated to sit in her stead).

Posted by azapp @ Fri, Dec 9, 2005

Article: Death Penalty Sentencing Clarified

An article by Paul Davenport Associated Press Dec. 9, 2005 reprinted on azcentral.com.

The Arizona Supreme Court clarified ground rules for death penalty cases Thursday, ruling that jurors should decide whether mitigating evidence is sufficient to warrant leniency without trying to weigh that evidence against circumstances supporting a death sentence.

Posted by azapp @ Fri, Dec 9, 2005

Article: State High Court Rejects Killer's Bid To Practice Law

An article by Michael Kiefer in The Arizona Republic dated Dec. 7, 2005 reports that James Hamm, the convicted murderer who earned a law degree, was denied the right to practice law when the Arizona Supreme Court issued a ruling Wednesday that he had failed to prove he was of good moral character.

Posted by azapp @ Fri, Dec 9, 2005

Article: Smith Attacks Powers Used By Clean Elections

An article by Robbie Sherwood, in the Arizona Republic dated Dec 7, 2005

A freshman lawmaker in danger of being ousted for overspending his publicly funded campaign budget got his day in court Tuesday.

Posted by azapp @ Fri, Dec 9, 2005

Arizona v. Gomez: Arizona Supreme Court Finds Errors in Judge Finding of Aggravating Factor and Visible Shackling of Capital Defendant.

Gomez was convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, and first degree murder, and was sentenced to death. On his automatic appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, he raised a number of issues. First, he argued that the jury instruction was erroneous insofar as it stated that premeditation did not require proof of “actual reflection.” Because no contemporaneous objection was made, the Court applied fundamental error analysis. The error was not fundamental, the Court held, because Gomez’ defense was one of “total innocence,” and not simply of a lack of premeditation. Second, he argued that the court erred in denying his request for a manslaughter instruction. The Court disagreed, noting that the jury implicitly rejected all lesser-included offenses by convicting Gomez of the highest offense, and that the evidence did not support a manslaughter theory. Third, Gomez argued that the court violated the rule of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), by aggravating his sentence based upon facts that were not admitted or found by the jury. The Court agreed and found fundamental error, insofar as the judge had aggravated Gomez’ sentence based on a finding (use of “more force than necessary” in the kidnapping) that was neither admitted by Gomez nor implicit in the jury’s verdict. Finally, Gomez argued that the court erred in overruling his objection to being shackled while representing himself in the aggravation and penalty phases of the trial. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005), the Court agreed, finding that the shackling (which was apparently visible to the jury) violated Gomez’ due process rights. The Court vacated Gomez’ death sentence and aggravated sentence for kidnapping, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Hurwitz.

Posted by azapp @ Thu, Dec 8, 2005

U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari to Review Unpublished Division One Case Involving Insanity Defense

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the unpublished Division One decision in Arizona v. Clark, in which the Court affirmed a first degree murder conviction and rejected constitutional challenges to Arizona’s law regarding proof of an insanity defense. (The Arizona Supreme Court denied the defendant’s Petition for Review.) The Questions Presented in the Petition for Certiorari were the following:

(1) Whether Arizona’s insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner’s right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

(2) Whether Arizona’s blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state’s evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner’s right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

The order granting certiorari does not specify that review is granted as to a particular question. The case is docketed in the Supreme Court as No. 05-5966.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 7, 2005

Feldmeier v. Watson: Supreme Court Issues Opinion in Yavapai County Initiative Case Holding That the Initiative Circulators’ Affidavits Substantially Complied With the Constitutional Requirements

Citizens for Responsible Growth (“CRG”), a political committee, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to amend the Prescott City Charter. The Arizona Constitution specifies a number of requirements for initiative petitions, including that the petition circulator verify the signatures in a sworn affidavit on the back of the petition. The verification requirement, provides, in pertinent part, that “every sheet of every [initiative or referendum] petition containing signatures shall be verified by the affidavit of the person who circulated said sheet or petition, setting forth . . . that in the belief of the affiant each signer was a qualified elector of the State, or in the case of a city, town, or county measure, of the city, town or county affected by the measure so proposed to be initiated or referred to the people.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9) (emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 19-112(C) (tracking the constitutional verification requirements). Section 19-112(D) A.R.S., in turn, sets forth the form for the circulator’s affidavit, repeating this language, and including a blank for the person to print his or her name, a blank for the county where the person is qualified to register to vote, but no blank to fill in the particular city, town, or county.

The Superior Court held that CRG’s circulator affidavit, which copied the form set forth in A.R.S. § 19-112(D), did not substantially comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements because the circulator’s affidavit failed to use the word “Prescott,” and instead used the generic “city, town, or county” language from the statute. Noting that the requirements as to the form and manner in which citizens exercise their power of initiative should be liberally construed (and elaborating on the applicable “substantial compliance” test for initiatives), the Supreme Court held that the circulators’ affidavits substantially complied with the statutory and constitutional requirements. The Court explained that although the legislature may have intended that the parenthetical language be replaced with the name of the local governmental entity, that intent is not clear from the face of A.R.S. § 19-112(D).

The Supreme Court rejected CRG’s requests for costs and attorneys fees under A.R.S. § 12-2030, noting that CRG did not bring the original action, that the Prescott City Clerk and Yavapai County Recorder did not fail to perform a duty required of them because they certified the initiative measure, and that it was the Superior Court that enjoined the measure.

Justice Ryan authored the unanimous opinion.

Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 7, 2005

Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage District v. Robertson: Arizona Supreme Court Grants Special Action Jurisdiction And Holds That Agricultural Landowners Seeking To Block Irrigation Districts From Relinquishing Central Arizona Project Water Rights Do Not Have Vested Rights To The Water In Question

By majority vote, landowners within two irrigation districts, the Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation and Drainage District and the Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District, approved a proposal to relinquish rights to receive water from the Central Arizona Project (“CAP”) in exchange for debt relief. The water is the subject of a master contract between the United States and the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (“CAWCD”) and related subcontracts with the irrigation districts. Some dissenting landowners filed two lawsuits, one against the irrigation districts and one against the CAWCD, alleging that the landowners had vested rights to CAP water that could not be abrogated without their consent.

The suit against CAWCD was removed to federal court and later dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028 9th Cir. 2005. The suit against the irrigation districts proceeded in superior court, which granted the dissenting landowners partial summary judgment, holding that they have vested rights to the CAP water governed by the subcontracts and that the irrigation districts may not alter those rights without the landowners’ consent. The irrigation districts, joined by about 200 owners of land within the districts, petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for special action relief.

The Arizona Supreme Court accepted special action jurisdiction and held that the superior court erred by ruling that the dissenting landowners have vested rights to receive CAP water. The court rejected both asserted bases for the claimed rights: 1) under the federal Reclamation Act of 1902, and 2) under a claim that the landowners were third-party beneficiaries of the subcontracts between the irrigation districts, the CAWCD and the United States.

Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and its subsequent decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), the Arizona Supreme Court held that distributions of water from the Lower Colorado River are not governed by the Reclamation Act, but instead by the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 (“BCPA”), codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617d, which establishes that no person is entitled to use of such water except by contract with the Secretary of the Interior. Since the dissenting landowners were not parties to any contract with the Secretary of the Interior, they have no vested rights to CAP water.

Furthermore, the dissenting landowners could not overcome their lack of a contract with the Secretary of the Interior by claiming to be third-party beneficiaries of the subcontracts between the irrigation districts, the CAWCD and the Secretary of the Interior. Because the landowners had already argued and lost their claim of third-party beneficiary status in the federal court litigation against CAWCD, they were barred by issue preclusion from re-litigating that same claim in state court.

Having concluded that the dissenting landowners do not have vested rights to CAP water, the court granted summary judgment for the irrigation districts, dismissed the complaint, and awarded the districts their attorneys’ fees incurred in the special action.

Justice Bales wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.

Posted by azapp @ Tue, Dec 6, 2005

Wilson v. Playa de Serrano: Division Two Finds That Homeowners’ Association’s Declaration Does Not Allow for Age-Based Occupancy Restriction

Wilson sued his homeowner’s association seeking a declaratory judgment that an amendment to the community’s bylaws imposing an age-based occupancy restriction was invalid. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the association, finding that the restriction was valid because the association complied with the Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA)

The court of appeals reversed, focusing on the specific language of the homeowners’ association’s Declaration. The court found that the Declaration did not specifically authorize the imposition of an occupancy restriction, as required by Section 6.7(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes. The court further found that a fundamental restriction of an individual owner’s property rights, such as restrictions on the occupancy of a dwelling, must be set forth with sufficient particularity that purchasers are on notice that the occupancy of their property could be restricted. Finally, the court held that compliance with HOPA—by itself—did not give the homeowners’ association the contractual authority or right to impose an age restriction on its members.

Judge Howard authored the opinion; Judges Brammer and Eckerstrom concurred.

Posted by azapp @ Tue, Dec 6, 2005

Nightclub Wants City To Pay Lawyers In 'Red Tag' Case

An Article in the Tucson Citizen, December 5, 2005 by A.J. Flick, reports that the Arizona Court of Appeals is set to hear arguments on whether the owners of Tucson nightclub will have to foot the bill for contesting red tags previously challenged in a Tucson Court.

Posted by azapp @ Mon, Dec 5, 2005

3 Nominated To Be Judge

An article in the Tucson Citizen, Friday, December 2, 2005 by A.J. Flick, reports that two judges and a Casa Grande attorney have been recommended to be the next Arizona Court of Appeals judge.

Posted by azapp @ Mon, Dec 5, 2005

Property Owners Relieved That Tempe Can't Take Land

An Article in the Arizona Republic, Nov. 30, 2005 reports that the Arizona Supreme Court ruled against Tempe on eminent domain issue.

Posted by azapp @ Mon, Dec 5, 2005