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Thursday, February 26, 2004
Shotwell v. Donahoe: Supreme Court Holds That EEOC Reasonable Cause Determinations are Not Per Se Admissible in Title VII Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, Declining to Follow Ninth Circuit Precedent
Background & Choice of Law
Plaintiff Shotwell sought special action relief in her Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit when, contrary to Ninth Circuit authority, the trial judge refused to admit the EEOC's reasonable cause determination in evidence. (A cause determination is a letter issued by the EEOC listing its conclusions after it investigates a discrimination claim.) The Supreme Court initially explained that although federal law governs substantive issues in connection with federal causes of action brought in state court, state rules of procedure and evidence apply to such proceedings unless the state rules would affect the substantive federal right. In this case, the state rules would not affect a plaintiff's substantive Title VII rights. Moreover, a circuit split on per se admissibility would permit Arizona courts to adopt either approach. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Arizona's rules of evidence govern the admissibility of cause determinations.
Per Se Rule
As for the merits of a per se rule, the Court found unconvincing the arguments that Arizona should follow the Ninth Circuit's position because a per se rule would promote uniformity between federal and state courts, encourage employer participation in EEOC investigations, and encourage settlements. The Court further noted that each of the states in the Ninth Circuit and other Circuits that have addressed the issue have rejected the Ninth Circuit's per se rule. The Court concluded that under Arizona's rules, courts should consider cause determinations pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Evidence just like any other document.
Rule 403
In this case, the trial court upheld the defendant's objection to exclude the cause determination pursuant to Rule 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. But the trial court's conclusory finding that the cause determination was unduly prejudicial did not provide an adequate record concerning the relevant Rule 403 factors. The Court explained the trial court should make a more detailed record concerning each of the Rule 403 factors -- probative value versus prejudicial effect, potential confusion of issues, undue delay, waste of time, and the potential for the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The trial court should also have considered whether portions of the cause determination could be admitted, or whether other safeguards such as limiting instructions could be used. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice Berch authored the unanimous opinion.
Background & Choice of Law
Plaintiff Shotwell sought special action relief in her Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit when, contrary to Ninth Circuit authority, the trial judge refused to admit the EEOC's reasonable cause determination in evidence. (A cause determination is a letter issued by the EEOC listing its conclusions after it investigates a discrimination claim.) The Supreme Court initially explained that although federal law governs substantive issues in connection with federal causes of action brought in state court, state rules of procedure and evidence apply to such proceedings unless the state rules would affect the substantive federal right. In this case, the state rules would not affect a plaintiff's substantive Title VII rights. Moreover, a circuit split on per se admissibility would permit Arizona courts to adopt either approach. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Arizona's rules of evidence govern the admissibility of cause determinations.
Per Se Rule
As for the merits of a per se rule, the Court found unconvincing the arguments that Arizona should follow the Ninth Circuit's position because a per se rule would promote uniformity between federal and state courts, encourage employer participation in EEOC investigations, and encourage settlements. The Court further noted that each of the states in the Ninth Circuit and other Circuits that have addressed the issue have rejected the Ninth Circuit's per se rule. The Court concluded that under Arizona's rules, courts should consider cause determinations pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Evidence just like any other document.
Rule 403
In this case, the trial court upheld the defendant's objection to exclude the cause determination pursuant to Rule 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence. But the trial court's conclusory finding that the cause determination was unduly prejudicial did not provide an adequate record concerning the relevant Rule 403 factors. The Court explained the trial court should make a more detailed record concerning each of the Rule 403 factors -- probative value versus prejudicial effect, potential confusion of issues, undue delay, waste of time, and the potential for the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The trial court should also have considered whether portions of the cause determination could be admitted, or whether other safeguards such as limiting instructions could be used. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice Berch authored the unanimous opinion.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Feb 26, 2004
Tuesday, February 24, 2004
Commentary Regarding Chief Justice Jones' Opposition to Changes in Judicial Selection Process
A commentary by Robert Robb recently appeared in the Arizona Republic regarding Chief Justice Jones' opposition to proposed changes in the judicial selection process. According to Robb, the measures proposed in the legislature are not "an 'attack' on the judiciary, these proposals are instead best seen as an awkward search to redress an imbalance in power between the judicial and legislative branches."
A commentary by Robert Robb recently appeared in the Arizona Republic regarding Chief Justice Jones' opposition to proposed changes in the judicial selection process. According to Robb, the measures proposed in the legislature are not "an 'attack' on the judiciary, these proposals are instead best seen as an awkward search to redress an imbalance in power between the judicial and legislative branches."
Posted by azapp @ Tue, Feb 24, 2004
Chief Justice Opposes Bills To Modify Judicial Selection
Arizona Capitol Times is running a story about Chief Justice Jones' opposition to several proposals in the legislature that would alter the judicial selection process for appellate and trial court judges. One of those measures would require appointments to the bench to be approved by the state Senate, and re-approved in the Senate every four years. According to the story, Chief Justice Jones feels that these measures would politicize the judiciary and tip the balance of power in favor of the legislature.
Arizona Capitol Times is running a story about Chief Justice Jones' opposition to several proposals in the legislature that would alter the judicial selection process for appellate and trial court judges. One of those measures would require appointments to the bench to be approved by the state Senate, and re-approved in the Senate every four years. According to the story, Chief Justice Jones feels that these measures would politicize the judiciary and tip the balance of power in favor of the legislature.
Posted by azapp @ Tue, Feb 24, 2004
Wednesday, February 18, 2004
Arizona Supreme Court Issues Summaries of Cases Set for Argument February 18 and 20
The Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorney's Office has issued summaries of the cases to be argued before the Court on Wednesday, February 18 and Friday, February 20. The summaries are prepared solely for educational purposes and should not be considered official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court. The Court will hear two cases on Wednesday: State v. Smyers, involving the question of whether a criminal defendant waived a claim of improper impeachment by failing to testify, and Galaz v. Stewart, involving the Board of Executive Clemency's power to grant parole eligibility while commuting a sentence. The Court will hear two more cases on Friday: Pleak v. Entrada Property Ass'n, involving property owners' power to dedicate real property to the general public, and North Valley Emergency Specialists v. Hon. Mark Santana, involving the exemption of employer-employee arbitration agreements from the Arizona Arbitration Act.
The Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorney's Office has issued summaries of the cases to be argued before the Court on Wednesday, February 18 and Friday, February 20. The summaries are prepared solely for educational purposes and should not be considered official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court. The Court will hear two cases on Wednesday: State v. Smyers, involving the question of whether a criminal defendant waived a claim of improper impeachment by failing to testify, and Galaz v. Stewart, involving the Board of Executive Clemency's power to grant parole eligibility while commuting a sentence. The Court will hear two more cases on Friday: Pleak v. Entrada Property Ass'n, involving property owners' power to dedicate real property to the general public, and North Valley Emergency Specialists v. Hon. Mark Santana, involving the exemption of employer-employee arbitration agreements from the Arizona Arbitration Act.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Feb 18, 2004
Tuesday, February 17, 2004
Kerr v. Killian: Arizona Supreme Court Upholds Arizona Income Tax Scheme
Arizona taxpayers who were employed by the federal government and who paid state income taxes on mandatory contributions to federal retirement plans filed a class action against the Arizona Department of Revenue, alleging that the Arizona tax scheme violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine codified in 4 U.S.C. Section 111(a). It challenged, among other things, the use in current A.R.S. Section 43-1001(2) of federal adjusted gross income as the base for Arizona taxable income because it allowed state employees whose contributions were "picked up" to avoid current taxation. Respondents argue that the tax scheme treats employee contributions of federal employees differently than those of state employees in violation of Section 111(a), because it does not similarly defer current taxation for employee contributions to federal retirement plans.
After a long and drawn-out procedural history, the case wound its way to the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the Arizona tax scheme did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, because it neither contains overt discrimination against any taxpayer because of the source of pay, nor is it a subterfuge for discrimination against federal employees because of their source of pay, nor is Arizona's treatment of respondents' employee contributions a necessary consequence of their federal status. The difference in treatment did not result from who pays the employees, but the voluntary choice made by the employer as to whether the contributions should be "picked up." The Court vacated a contrary opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the tax court and remanded on this issue.
Justice Hurwitz authored the Opinion; Chief Justice Jones, Vice Chief Justice McGregor, and Justices Berch and Ryan concurred.
Arizona taxpayers who were employed by the federal government and who paid state income taxes on mandatory contributions to federal retirement plans filed a class action against the Arizona Department of Revenue, alleging that the Arizona tax scheme violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine codified in 4 U.S.C. Section 111(a). It challenged, among other things, the use in current A.R.S. Section 43-1001(2) of federal adjusted gross income as the base for Arizona taxable income because it allowed state employees whose contributions were "picked up" to avoid current taxation. Respondents argue that the tax scheme treats employee contributions of federal employees differently than those of state employees in violation of Section 111(a), because it does not similarly defer current taxation for employee contributions to federal retirement plans.
After a long and drawn-out procedural history, the case wound its way to the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the Arizona tax scheme did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, because it neither contains overt discrimination against any taxpayer because of the source of pay, nor is it a subterfuge for discrimination against federal employees because of their source of pay, nor is Arizona's treatment of respondents' employee contributions a necessary consequence of their federal status. The difference in treatment did not result from who pays the employees, but the voluntary choice made by the employer as to whether the contributions should be "picked up." The Court vacated a contrary opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the tax court and remanded on this issue.
Justice Hurwitz authored the Opinion; Chief Justice Jones, Vice Chief Justice McGregor, and Justices Berch and Ryan concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Tue, Feb 17, 2004
Monday, February 16, 2004
Winters v. Arizona Board of Education: Division One Holds That A "Nexus" Between A Teacher's Off-Campus Conduct and His or Her Fitness To Teach Must Be Found Before Disciplinary Action Against The Teacher May Be Taken.
On February 12, 2004, Division One affirmed a judgment upholding the revocation of a high school teacher's teaching certificate. The Buckeye Union High School teacher had been charged in five different instances with disorderly, harassing and intimidating conduct occurring outside of the high school. The Arizona Board of Education initiated disciplinary proceedings against the teacher and revoked his teaching certificate. The teacher sought judicial review in the superior court, which affirmed the revocation. The teacher then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The teacher argued that his conduct did not consitute "unprofessional conduct" under A.R.S. 15-203(A)(20), because there was no evidence that it affected the operation of the school. The Court of Appeals agreed with the general premise of the teacher's argument, holding "that the off-campus acts for which a teacher is being disciplined need not be limited to teacher-student interactions, but must relate to his/her fitness as a teacher and must have an adverse effect on or within the school community." But the Court rejected the teacher's contention that this standard was not satisfied in his case, noting that his acts involved threats against children and a tendency to react with violence and aggression -- characteristics that did relate to his fitness as a teacher and indicated a threat to the school community that the Board could properly act to abate.
The decision was authored by Superior Court Judge M. Jean Hoag and joined by Judges Irvine and Erlich.
Practice Notes:
Judge Hoag was authorized to participate in the case by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
The teacher argued on appeal that the Board acted contrary to law by failing to issue a definition of the statutory term "immoral or unprofessional conduct" by the date specified by statute. The Court refused to address this argument because the teacher had not raised it in the Superior Court, noting: "When a challenge is not raised with specificity and addressed in the trial court, we generally do not consider it on appeal."
On February 12, 2004, Division One affirmed a judgment upholding the revocation of a high school teacher's teaching certificate. The Buckeye Union High School teacher had been charged in five different instances with disorderly, harassing and intimidating conduct occurring outside of the high school. The Arizona Board of Education initiated disciplinary proceedings against the teacher and revoked his teaching certificate. The teacher sought judicial review in the superior court, which affirmed the revocation. The teacher then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The teacher argued that his conduct did not consitute "unprofessional conduct" under A.R.S. 15-203(A)(20), because there was no evidence that it affected the operation of the school. The Court of Appeals agreed with the general premise of the teacher's argument, holding "that the off-campus acts for which a teacher is being disciplined need not be limited to teacher-student interactions, but must relate to his/her fitness as a teacher and must have an adverse effect on or within the school community." But the Court rejected the teacher's contention that this standard was not satisfied in his case, noting that his acts involved threats against children and a tendency to react with violence and aggression -- characteristics that did relate to his fitness as a teacher and indicated a threat to the school community that the Board could properly act to abate.
The decision was authored by Superior Court Judge M. Jean Hoag and joined by Judges Irvine and Erlich.
Practice Notes:
Judge Hoag was authorized to participate in the case by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
The teacher argued on appeal that the Board acted contrary to law by failing to issue a definition of the statutory term "immoral or unprofessional conduct" by the date specified by statute. The Court refused to address this argument because the teacher had not raised it in the Superior Court, noting: "When a challenge is not raised with specificity and addressed in the trial court, we generally do not consider it on appeal."
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 16, 2004
Thursday, February 12, 2004
State Files Opposition To Petition For Review In Gay Marriage Case; Commentary On Eminent Domain Case
An article appearing on azcentral.com notes that the State yesterday filed its opposition to the petition for review in the gay marriage case discussed in previous postings and includes quotes from each side's attorneys. A commentary discusses a proposition related to the Court of Appeals' eminent domain decision discussed in previous postings.
An article appearing on azcentral.com notes that the State yesterday filed its opposition to the petition for review in the gay marriage case discussed in previous postings and includes quotes from each side's attorneys. A commentary discusses a proposition related to the Court of Appeals' eminent domain decision discussed in previous postings.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Feb 12, 2004
Wednesday, February 11, 2004
Arizona Supreme Court Issues Further Minutes
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued Part B of its Minutes for February 10, 2004. The Court ruled on 49 petitions, granting six, continuing three, and denying the rest. The Minutes note that Justice Hurwitz voted to grant review in two of the cases in which the petitions were denied.
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued Part B of its Minutes for February 10, 2004. The Court ruled on 49 petitions, granting six, continuing three, and denying the rest. The Minutes note that Justice Hurwitz voted to grant review in two of the cases in which the petitions were denied.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Feb 11, 2004
Transcript of Attorney General Goddard's Argument in U.S. Supreme Court
To view a transcript of Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard's argument before the United States Supreme Court in Hibbs v. Winn, which was the subject of previous postings, click here.
To view a transcript of Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard's argument before the United States Supreme Court in Hibbs v. Winn, which was the subject of previous postings, click here.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Feb 11, 2004
Arizona Supreme Court Issues Minutes
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued Part A of its Minutes for February 10, 2004. (The court typically issues minutes in two parts--A and B.) Minutes rule on petitions for review, special actions, requests for attorneys fees, and other matters. In Part A, the court did not accept jurisdiction or review of any of the 12 cases it considered.
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued Part A of its Minutes for February 10, 2004. (The court typically issues minutes in two parts--A and B.) Minutes rule on petitions for review, special actions, requests for attorneys fees, and other matters. In Part A, the court did not accept jurisdiction or review of any of the 12 cases it considered.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Feb 11, 2004
Monday, February 9, 2004
Speros v. Yu: Division One Holds That a Subdivision Alley Constituted an Interior Roadway Under Phoenix City Code §31-64(c)(3) Subject to Common Use Between Properties
After the City of Phoenix abandoned and quit-claimed a subdivision alley to the plaintiff, the plaintiff told the defendant to stop using the alley. The defendant refused because the alley was located between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s property and she and others used the alley to access her business. The parties sued each other, each relying on Phoenix City Code § 31-64(c), which governs the vesting of title when the City abandons property. The plaintiff maintained that Phoenix City Code § 31-64(c)(1), which governs the vesting of title in a roadway “which constitutes an exterior boundary of a subdivision or other tract of land,” entitled him to the property because the alley constituted an “exterior boundary” to his “tract of land.” The plaintiff maintained that subsection (c)(3), which vests title in a vacated roadway “bounded by straight lines” equally to the owners of the abutting land, required that both parties take title to the alley. The Court noted that alleys in the subdivision permitted access between different areas for common use and purpose. Given this use of shared roadways within subdivisions, the Court held that read in context the phrase “other tract of land” in subsection (c)(1) refers to a tract that is not within a subdivision. Accordingly, the Court held that the alley constituted an abandoned roadway between properties under subsection (c)(3), thereby affirming the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
Judge Irvine authored the Opinion; Judges Hall and Gemmill concurred.
After the City of Phoenix abandoned and quit-claimed a subdivision alley to the plaintiff, the plaintiff told the defendant to stop using the alley. The defendant refused because the alley was located between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s property and she and others used the alley to access her business. The parties sued each other, each relying on Phoenix City Code § 31-64(c), which governs the vesting of title when the City abandons property. The plaintiff maintained that Phoenix City Code § 31-64(c)(1), which governs the vesting of title in a roadway “which constitutes an exterior boundary of a subdivision or other tract of land,” entitled him to the property because the alley constituted an “exterior boundary” to his “tract of land.” The plaintiff maintained that subsection (c)(3), which vests title in a vacated roadway “bounded by straight lines” equally to the owners of the abutting land, required that both parties take title to the alley. The Court noted that alleys in the subdivision permitted access between different areas for common use and purpose. Given this use of shared roadways within subdivisions, the Court held that read in context the phrase “other tract of land” in subsection (c)(1) refers to a tract that is not within a subdivision. Accordingly, the Court held that the alley constituted an abandoned roadway between properties under subsection (c)(3), thereby affirming the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
Judge Irvine authored the Opinion; Judges Hall and Gemmill concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 9, 2004
Commentary Criticizes Superior Court Districting Decision
A commentary appearing on azcentral.com criticizes the Superior Court's decision with respect to Arizona's legislative districts, which was the subject of previous postings. The commentary notes that the redistricting commission has asked the Court of Appeals to stay the Superior Court's order.
A commentary appearing on azcentral.com criticizes the Superior Court's decision with respect to Arizona's legislative districts, which was the subject of previous postings. The commentary notes that the redistricting commission has asked the Court of Appeals to stay the Superior Court's order.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 9, 2004
ChartOne, Inc. v. Bernini and Smart Professional Photocopy Corp. v. Bernini: Division Two Holds that Rule 53 Does Not Authorize the Appointment of a Special Master in Some Cases and That Appointment of a Special Master Deprived Defendants of Their Right to a Jury Trial
Personal injury attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against defendants ChartOne and Smart Professional, contractors that provide medial records production services to medical groups. Plaintiffs brought a breach of implied contract claim, alleging that defendants had violated A.R.S. § 12-2295 by charging unreasonable fees for their services. The judge bifurcated the trial over defendants’ objection, but ordered that the same jury would hear both phases if liability were found. The parties were prevented from introducing evidence that related to damages during the liability portion of the trial. While the jury was deliberating on the issue of liability, the judge vacated her order bifurcating the trial and stated that if the jury found for the plaintiffs she would appoint a special master to determine damages. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the judge appointed a special master selected by the plaintiffs. The judge agreed to stay the proceedings while Defendants brought special actions challenging her authority to appoint a special master and the constitutionality of the judge’s decision to vacate her order bifurcating the trial after she had allowed the case to proceed through the liability phase. The court of appeals accepted special action jurisdiction.
Judge Espinosa, writing for a unanimous court, held that the plain language and history of the Rule 53 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that a court may only appoint a special master in cases that are not being tried to a jury. The court found that the trial judge erred as a matter of law because the underlying action began as a case to be tried to a jury. Judge Espinosa found that the judge abused her discretion when she vacated her order bifurcating the trial at the end of the liability phase because it resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendants. Furthermore, the court held that the judge’s decision to have a special master determine damages relieved plaintiffs of their burden of establishing damages as an essential element of their breach of contract claim and violated the defendant’s right to have a jury consider questions of fact that remained regarding plaintiffs’ damages.
The court vacated the judge’s order appointing a special master and vacating the previous order bifurcating the trial and remanded for a jury trial on damages. Judges Pelander and Eckerstrom concurred.
Personal injury attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against defendants ChartOne and Smart Professional, contractors that provide medial records production services to medical groups. Plaintiffs brought a breach of implied contract claim, alleging that defendants had violated A.R.S. § 12-2295 by charging unreasonable fees for their services. The judge bifurcated the trial over defendants’ objection, but ordered that the same jury would hear both phases if liability were found. The parties were prevented from introducing evidence that related to damages during the liability portion of the trial. While the jury was deliberating on the issue of liability, the judge vacated her order bifurcating the trial and stated that if the jury found for the plaintiffs she would appoint a special master to determine damages. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the judge appointed a special master selected by the plaintiffs. The judge agreed to stay the proceedings while Defendants brought special actions challenging her authority to appoint a special master and the constitutionality of the judge’s decision to vacate her order bifurcating the trial after she had allowed the case to proceed through the liability phase. The court of appeals accepted special action jurisdiction.
Judge Espinosa, writing for a unanimous court, held that the plain language and history of the Rule 53 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that a court may only appoint a special master in cases that are not being tried to a jury. The court found that the trial judge erred as a matter of law because the underlying action began as a case to be tried to a jury. Judge Espinosa found that the judge abused her discretion when she vacated her order bifurcating the trial at the end of the liability phase because it resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendants. Furthermore, the court held that the judge’s decision to have a special master determine damages relieved plaintiffs of their burden of establishing damages as an essential element of their breach of contract claim and violated the defendant’s right to have a jury consider questions of fact that remained regarding plaintiffs’ damages.
The court vacated the judge’s order appointing a special master and vacating the previous order bifurcating the trial and remanded for a jury trial on damages. Judges Pelander and Eckerstrom concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 9, 2004
Thursday, February 5, 2004
Maricopa Lawyer Commentary On Appellate Lawyers
A commentary appearing in the February issue of the Maricopa Lawyer discusses the reasons why attorneys should consider bringing in attorneys with an extra measure of appellate experience when their cases are nearing the appeal phase.
A commentary appearing in the February issue of the Maricopa Lawyer discusses the reasons why attorneys should consider bringing in attorneys with an extra measure of appellate experience when their cases are nearing the appeal phase.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Feb 5, 2004
Appeal Planned in Case of Peoria Police Sniper
An article appearing on azcentral.com reports that an appeal will be pursued in the Arizona Court of Appeals in the case of a former Peoria Police sniper who lost his job after shooting a man who was holding his own baby hostage. The Maricopa County Superior Court ordered the officer reinstated.
An article appearing on azcentral.com reports that an appeal will be pursued in the Arizona Court of Appeals in the case of a former Peoria Police sniper who lost his job after shooting a man who was holding his own baby hostage. The Maricopa County Superior Court ordered the officer reinstated.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Feb 5, 2004
Orsett/Columbia Limited Partnership v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, et. al.: Division One Holds That A.R.S. § 12-1111 Does Not Permit a County to Condemn a Leasehold Interest in a Building
Maricopa County leased property located in Peoria, Arizona, for use by the Peoria Justice Court. The lease expired and the parties failed to negotiate a new lease. In June, 2003, the County filed a Complaint in eminent domain, seeking to condemn a 23 month leasehold interest in the property on the same terms as the prior lease, except for rent. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order permitting the County to remain in possession of the property for the 23 month period. The owner filed a petition for special action with the Court of Appeals, which was granted.
On appeal, the County, relying on In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472 (1934), argued that a leasehold interest is simply one stick in a bundle of property rights, and that it has the right under Arizona’s eminent domain statutes to “take only what it needs.” Accordingly, the County reasoned, the power of eminent domain extends to leasehold interests. Division One disagreed, holding that the County may exercise the power of eminent domain only as that power is granted to it by the State. The County’s eminent domain power was therefore limited to the purposes enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-1111, which is interpreted narrowly. The Court held that use of the phrase “fee simple” in that statute does not permit the condemnation of a mere leasehold interest, because those words refer to an interest acquired “in its entirety and as a perpetuity.” A leasehold interest, by definition, cannot be taken in perpetuity. Given this statutory restriction specific to Arizona, the Court rejected citations to other jurisdictions holding that the power of eminent domain extended to leasehold interests. Accordingly, Division One vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Hall authored the Opinion; Judges Barker and Kessler concurred.
Maricopa County leased property located in Peoria, Arizona, for use by the Peoria Justice Court. The lease expired and the parties failed to negotiate a new lease. In June, 2003, the County filed a Complaint in eminent domain, seeking to condemn a 23 month leasehold interest in the property on the same terms as the prior lease, except for rent. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order permitting the County to remain in possession of the property for the 23 month period. The owner filed a petition for special action with the Court of Appeals, which was granted.
On appeal, the County, relying on In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472 (1934), argued that a leasehold interest is simply one stick in a bundle of property rights, and that it has the right under Arizona’s eminent domain statutes to “take only what it needs.” Accordingly, the County reasoned, the power of eminent domain extends to leasehold interests. Division One disagreed, holding that the County may exercise the power of eminent domain only as that power is granted to it by the State. The County’s eminent domain power was therefore limited to the purposes enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-1111, which is interpreted narrowly. The Court held that use of the phrase “fee simple” in that statute does not permit the condemnation of a mere leasehold interest, because those words refer to an interest acquired “in its entirety and as a perpetuity.” A leasehold interest, by definition, cannot be taken in perpetuity. Given this statutory restriction specific to Arizona, the Court rejected citations to other jurisdictions holding that the power of eminent domain extended to leasehold interests. Accordingly, Division One vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Hall authored the Opinion; Judges Barker and Kessler concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Feb 5, 2004
Tuesday, February 3, 2004
Booth v. State: Division Two Panel Holds that Ferae Naturae Doctrine Does Not Bar a Negligence Claim Against State for Injury Caused by Elk on the Highway
Plaintiff was severely injured when his car collided with an elk at night on Interstate 40 (I-40). He sued the State for negligently failing to prevent elk from entering portions of I-40 where the presence of Elk was well known. Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that the number of collisions between automobiles and elk or deer within five miles of the site of his collision had dramatically increased in the years prior to the accident. The State had responded by posting additional warning signs but had taken no other action. Plaintiff argued that the State should have erected wildlife fences, created underpasses, and taken other measures to control elk and deer as it had successfully done on Arizona State Route 260.
The State argued, however, that as a matter of law the doctrine of ferae naturae prevents the State from being held liable for injuries caused by indigenous wild animals. The doctrine is based on the notion that a landowner does not own the wild animals on his land (they belong to the people at large) and so cannot be held strictly liable for the acts of such animals on his land. The trial court denied the State’s motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law. The jury returned “a substantial verdict” for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to submit the case to the jury. Judge Eckerstrom, writing for the Division Two panel, explained that the doctrine of ferae naturae has not been held to be an absolute bar against negligence claims involving wild animals. According to the panel, few courts have found liability in such circumstances because the risk of wild animals often cannot be reasonably foreseen and protected against. In this case, however, the State conceded that it had a duty to keep highways safe for travelers. Given that, the court was unwilling to conclude that no reasonable jury could have found that the State had breached its duty by failing to take protective measures beyond posting warning signs. The court was also not persuaded by arguments presented by amicus curiae that liability should be precluded based on public policy considerations regarding “the unpredictability of wild animals.” The court explained that its ruling “does not divest trial courts of their gate-keeping function” and that it should not be understood to have said that all claims involving wild animals merit presentation to a jury.
Judges Espinosa and Pelander joined the opinion.
Plaintiff was severely injured when his car collided with an elk at night on Interstate 40 (I-40). He sued the State for negligently failing to prevent elk from entering portions of I-40 where the presence of Elk was well known. Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that the number of collisions between automobiles and elk or deer within five miles of the site of his collision had dramatically increased in the years prior to the accident. The State had responded by posting additional warning signs but had taken no other action. Plaintiff argued that the State should have erected wildlife fences, created underpasses, and taken other measures to control elk and deer as it had successfully done on Arizona State Route 260.
The State argued, however, that as a matter of law the doctrine of ferae naturae prevents the State from being held liable for injuries caused by indigenous wild animals. The doctrine is based on the notion that a landowner does not own the wild animals on his land (they belong to the people at large) and so cannot be held strictly liable for the acts of such animals on his land. The trial court denied the State’s motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law. The jury returned “a substantial verdict” for the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to submit the case to the jury. Judge Eckerstrom, writing for the Division Two panel, explained that the doctrine of ferae naturae has not been held to be an absolute bar against negligence claims involving wild animals. According to the panel, few courts have found liability in such circumstances because the risk of wild animals often cannot be reasonably foreseen and protected against. In this case, however, the State conceded that it had a duty to keep highways safe for travelers. Given that, the court was unwilling to conclude that no reasonable jury could have found that the State had breached its duty by failing to take protective measures beyond posting warning signs. The court was also not persuaded by arguments presented by amicus curiae that liability should be precluded based on public policy considerations regarding “the unpredictability of wild animals.” The court explained that its ruling “does not divest trial courts of their gate-keeping function” and that it should not be understood to have said that all claims involving wild animals merit presentation to a jury.
Judges Espinosa and Pelander joined the opinion.
Posted by azapp @ Tue, Feb 3, 2004
Monday, February 2, 2004
Pence v. Glacy: Division One Affirms Trial Court’s Holding That Scienter is a Requirement to be Liable for Statutory Damages for Recording an Invalid Lien Against Another’s Property Under A.R.S. § 33-420(A)
The trial court made a factual finding that the deed of trust the appellee filed against the appellant’s property was invalid because the deed did not contain appellant’s husband’s signature, which was required to bind the marital community under A.R.S. § 25-214(C). Even so, the trial court found that the appellee was not liable for statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33 420(A) for recording an invalid lien against appellant’s residence because appellee lacked scienter. Appellant appealed, arguing that presumption of knowledge of the law provided the necessary scienter under the statute. Accepting the trial court’s factual determination that the deed was invalid, Judge Garbarino rejected appellant’s argument and held that a plaintiff is required to show that a defendant knew or had reason to know that a deed was invalid in order to be liable for statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). Judge Garbarino deferred to the trial court’s factual finding that the appellee did not know or have reason to know that the lien he filed was invalid and affirmed the trial court’s finding in favor of appellee.
Judges Timmer and Hall joined in the opinion.
The trial court made a factual finding that the deed of trust the appellee filed against the appellant’s property was invalid because the deed did not contain appellant’s husband’s signature, which was required to bind the marital community under A.R.S. § 25-214(C). Even so, the trial court found that the appellee was not liable for statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33 420(A) for recording an invalid lien against appellant’s residence because appellee lacked scienter. Appellant appealed, arguing that presumption of knowledge of the law provided the necessary scienter under the statute. Accepting the trial court’s factual determination that the deed was invalid, Judge Garbarino rejected appellant’s argument and held that a plaintiff is required to show that a defendant knew or had reason to know that a deed was invalid in order to be liable for statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). Judge Garbarino deferred to the trial court’s factual finding that the appellee did not know or have reason to know that the lien he filed was invalid and affirmed the trial court’s finding in favor of appellee.
Judges Timmer and Hall joined in the opinion.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 2, 2004
Raven Rock Construction, L.L.C. v. Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County: Division One Holds That the Board of Supervisors Has Authority to Establish Procedures for Exempting Property From the Maricopa County Ordinances
Raven Rock appealed a superior court judgment affirming the decision of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to uphold a hearing officer’s determination that Raven Rock violated Section 1102.9 of the Maricopa County Zoning Ordinance. Raven Rock maintained that it need not comply with Ordinance Section 1102.9 because A.R.S. § 11-830 exempts agricultural property from that and certain other regulations set forth in the County Ordinances. The County Ordinances, however, set forth procedures to exempt property as agricultural property, with which Raven Rock had not complied. Raven Rock argued that it need not comply with these procedures because they too violated A.R.S. § 11-830. Rejecting this position, the Court held that the Maricopa Board of Supervisors may, consistent with A.R.S. § 11-830, enact reasonable procedures to exempt property from the application of certain Maricopa County ordinances.
Judge Ehrlich authored the opinion; Judges Irvine and Stephens concurred.
Raven Rock appealed a superior court judgment affirming the decision of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to uphold a hearing officer’s determination that Raven Rock violated Section 1102.9 of the Maricopa County Zoning Ordinance. Raven Rock maintained that it need not comply with Ordinance Section 1102.9 because A.R.S. § 11-830 exempts agricultural property from that and certain other regulations set forth in the County Ordinances. The County Ordinances, however, set forth procedures to exempt property as agricultural property, with which Raven Rock had not complied. Raven Rock argued that it need not comply with these procedures because they too violated A.R.S. § 11-830. Rejecting this position, the Court held that the Maricopa Board of Supervisors may, consistent with A.R.S. § 11-830, enact reasonable procedures to exempt property from the application of certain Maricopa County ordinances.
Judge Ehrlich authored the opinion; Judges Irvine and Stephens concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Feb 2, 2004
