AZAPP is a blog that provides a thorough, up-to-date, and efficient resource to stay abreast of significant developments concerning civil cases in Arizona's appellate courts - the two Divisions of the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Nelson v. Grayhawk is a personal injury suit alleging negligent maintenance of a roadway. The trial court granted summary judgment to the developer-defendant Grayhawk because non-party City of Scottsdale had a non-delegable duty to keep the roadway safe pursuant to Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz. 367 (2000). The Court of Appeals reversed holding that, while a city may be held 100% liable for the acts of its agents under Wiggs, that does not mean that solely the City may be held liable. Quoting Wiggs, the court explained that "the imposition of a non-delegable duty on a municipality 'no more immunizes an independent contractor for its own negligence than an employee of an employer.'"
Judge Thompson wrote the opinion; Presiding Judge Portley and Judge Barker joined.
Posted by azapp @ Tue, Dec 28, 2004
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued summaries of the cases to be argued on Tuesday, January 11. The Court will hear argument in two cases: (1) Kent K. and Sherry K. v. Bobby M., involving the question of whether a petitioner seeking severance of a parent's parental rights must show by "clear and convincing evidence" that severance is in the child's best interest, and (2) State v. Rivera, involving the question of whether the existence of "consistency agreements," requiring witnesses to testify consistently with their prior statements or risk losing their plea agreements, required that the defendant convicted on the basis of such witnesses' testimony receive a new trial. The Court's argument summaries are prepared for educational purposes and do not constitute official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 22, 2004
This case reviewed a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, which had prevented construction of a particular Wal-Mart in the City of Casa Grande. The Court of Appeals had held that strict compliance with notification requirements under the local and state zoning procedures was required. Because notice of the potential zoning change had not been mailed to the address of the complaining property owners' actual residence, the Court found that the zoning ordinance allowing construction of the Wal-Mart was null and void.
Upon taking review, the Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of a referendum election on the plaintiffs' right to sue. After the zoning ordinance passed and before the plaintiffs filed suit, a referendum election occurred in which the zoning ordinance was approved by the voters of Casa Grande.
The Court found the referendum issue dispositive and held that plaintiffs were required to raise any procedural defects to the ordinance before the referendum election. The Court relied upon its prior election jurisprudence in reaching this conclusion. It did not find meaningful the distinction that the procedural defect in this case was a defect relating to the City Council's enactment of the ordinance rather than a defect a relating to the referendum procedures that placed the issue on the ballot.
The Court held that because the plaintiffs waited on the result of the referendum before filing suit, they had affirmed the validity of the election. Their claim was barred by laches.
Chief Justice Jones wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
Posted by azapp @ Sun, Dec 19, 2004
An article on azcentral.com reports that the Arizona Supreme Court recently amended its rules to require that criminal defendants be informed that a guilty plea could lead to their deportation. Another article reports that the Court in a pending case will address the issue of which misdemeanors merit jury trials. Another article discusses the argument in a recent capital murder appeal, which focused on the process by which the jury determined that the defendant should be sentenced to death.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 8, 2004
The United Effort Plan Trust (“UEPT”) manages property for members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“Church”) who subscribe to the principles of the United Order of Heaven. Under those principles, Church members give their property to “the Lord and the Church” to demonstrate their devotion and faithfulness, and receive an “inheritance” or “stewardship” from the bishop of the Church. Pursuant to this practice, Milton Holm built a family home in 1976 on UEPT property in Colorado City with the understanding that he would always have a place to care for his family. The Church, at various times, sought to clarify its legal relationship with those who resided on UEPT property, including sending Holm a letter in 1987 stating that all residents on UEPT land were tenants-at-will, residing on the land “at the pleasure” of the UEPT trustees.
In 2000, UEPT filed a forcible detainer against Mr. and Mrs. Holm after Mrs. Holm failed to consent to a marriage between her fifteen year old daughter and a thirty-nine year old man who was already married. The trial court held a bench trial, and ultimately dismissed UEPT’s complaint, but in doing so also entered a number of executory orders addressing various aspects of the parties’ legal rights with respect to the property in issue. The Court of Appeals explained that a forcible detainer action is a summary proceeding with a limited purpose. Such an action is premised on the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and is not a vehicle for determining whether such a relationship exists. “A real dispute regarding a landlord-tenant relationship must be tried in an ‘ordinary civil action, in which time periods are not accelerated, counter- and cross claims are allowed, and there is an opportunity for discovery.’” The Court of Appeals thus explained that the trial court should have dismissed UEPT’s complaint because a genuine issue existed concerning the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, but erred in entering various orders that went to the merits of the parties’ dispute. Citing the rule that the Court of Appeals will affirm the trial court when it reaches the correct conclusion even if it does so for an incorrect reason, the Court affirmed the dismissal of UEPT’s complaint and vacated the other orders entered by the trial court.
Justice Ehrlich authored the opinion; Judges Winthrop and Judge Pro Temp Aceto concurred.
Posted by azapp @ Mon, Dec 6, 2004
Order Enjoining Proposition 200
Here is a copy of Judge Bury's order enjoining the implementation of Proposition 200. As noted in a previous posting, the Attorney General previously opined concerning certain limitations to Prop. 200.Posted by azapp @ Fri, Dec 3, 2004
Lachter v. Smith: Supreme Court Holds That: (1) As Matter Of Arizona Law, The Time To File An Affidavit Of Renewal Of Judgment Is Not Changed Or Extended By The Pendency Of A Bankruptcy Case; And (2) Assuming Federal Law Extends The Time For Filing The Renewal Affidavit Form, A Renewal Affidavit Is Timely Filed Any Time Between The Unextended Statutory Deadline And The Expiration Of The Deadline As Extended By The Automatic Stay.
Under Arizona law, a judgment creditor may not execute on a judgment that is more than five years old unless the judgment creditor files an affidavit of renewal within ninety days of the judgment’s fifth anniversary. A.R.S. §§ 12-1551(A), 12-1612(E). Subsequent affidavits of renewal must likewise be filed every five years during the ninety days leading up to the subsequent five-year deadlines to keep the judgment effective. A.R.S. § 12-1612(E). Under the bankruptcy laws, a petition for bankruptcy operates to stay actions to collect judgments, but does not specifically address affidavits of renewal, which involve mere notice about the judgment.
In this case, the judgment was entered in 1987 and timely renewed in March 1992. The judgment debtor declared bankruptcy, and the automatic stay was issued in July 1995. The stay remained in effect for 487 days to November 1996. Thus, absent any effect from the stay, the original renewal deadline was March 1997 (five years after March 1992), and the ninety-day window for renewing would have begun in December 1996. The judgment creditor filed an affidavit of renewal in November and December 1997, after the bankruptcy court ruled that the judgment was nondischargeable.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the bankruptcy code extended the time to renew the judgment by the length of the automatic stay following the discharge, i.e., 487 days. Under this analysis, the judgment expired in July 1998, 487 days after the original renewal deadline of March 1997, and the ninety-day window for filing any renewal of affidavit would have begun in April 1998, months after the judgment creditors filed their second affidavit of renewal. The BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine whether this early renewal was effective. The bankruptcy court then certified two questions to the Arizona Supreme Court:
(1) When a pending bankruptcy case is unresolved and the time period under Arizona law to file the required affidavit of renewal of judgment has passed, under what circumstances, if any, is the time period under A.R.S. [§] 12-1551 extended or otherwise changed to allow the judgment creditor to file a timely affidavit of renewal of judgment?
(2) Were either of the affidavits of renewal of judgment filed by the Lachters timely filed?
With respect to the first question, the Court held that although the automatic stay extends the time to enforce an action, it does not extend the time to file an affidavit of renewal if the automatic stay is in effect during the otherwise applicable ninety-day window. The Court reasoned that filing an affidavit of renewal is a purely ministerial act intended only to provide notice.
With respect to the second question, the Court assumed, as the BAP ruled, that as a matter of federal law, the bankruptcy code extended the time for filing the renewal of affidavit. The Court held that with this assumption “Arizona law would treat an affidavit of renewal filed any time between December 6, 1996, the date ninety days preceding the [judgment creditors’] original second renewal deadline under A.R.S. § 12-1612(E), and the extended deadline of July 6, 1998, as having been timely filed.” Thus, the affidavits of renewal were timely filed.
Justice Berch authored the Court’s unanimous decision.
Posted by azapp @ Thu, Dec 2, 2004
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued its Minutes for November 30, 2004, in two parts, Part A and Part B. The Court ruled on six special-action petitions, accepting jurisdiction of one. The Court ruled on 49 Petitions for Review, granting six. The Court denied the Petition for Review in Long v. City of Glendale, which has been the subject of previous postings.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 1, 2004
The Arizona Supreme Court has issued a summary of the case to be argued on Tuesday, December 7. The case, State v. Anderson, involves a number of statutory and constitutional issues raised by a defendant sentenced to death for multiple murders, including whether the death-penalty statute's standard of review is unconstitutional, whether the defendant was improperly deprived of pretrial notice of aggravating factors, and whether the use of different juries at the sentencing and trial phases was improper. The Court's argument summaries are prepared for educational purposes and do not constitute official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 1, 2004
An article on azcentral.com reports that the Arizona Supreme court has agreed to hear a case involving the question of whether motorists can use claims of racial profiling as a defense in criminal trials stemming from traffic stops by police.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 1, 2004
The Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorney's Office has issued a summary of the Safeway v. Guerrero case to be argued before the Court on Thursday, December 2nd. Summaries are prepared solely for educational purposes and should not be considered official commentary by the Court or any member of the Court.
Posted by azapp @ Wed, Dec 1, 2004
