AZAPP is a blog that provides a thorough, up-to-date, and efficient resource to stay abreast of significant developments concerning civil cases in Arizona's appellate courts - the two Divisions of the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court.
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Thursday, October 9, 2003
Standardt v. Superior Court: Division One Upholds State Ban on Same-Sex Marriage After Lawrence v. Texas
On October 8, 2003, a panel of Division One upheld Arizona's statutory ban on same-sex marriages against challenge under the state and federal constitutions. This special action was brought after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lawrence v. Texas striking down as violative of due process those laws which criminalize sexual activity between persons of the same sex. Petitioners argued that Lawrence implicitly recognized a fundamental right to same-sex marriage and that Arizona's statutory ban on such marriage (see A.R.S. §§ 25-101(C), 25-125(A)) could not withstand stricscrutinyny. The panel, however, refused to extend the holding of Lawrence declaring that there is no fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriage and that limiting state-sanctioned marriage to those of the opposite sex furthered a legitimate governmental purpose of fostering procreation in stable, long-term committed relationships.
In rejecting petitioners' arguments, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence expressly declared that its holding did not reach "whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the Lawrence decision was decided on rational basis review -- suggesting that the Lawrence Court had not recognized a protected fundamental right to enter in same-gender sexual relations.
In a noteworthy passage, the court declared that fundamental rights protected by the Arizona Constitution's due process clause "are those firmly entrenched in our state's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that may be, or may not be, shared with the rest of the country." The court found that entry into state sanctioned same-sex relationships did not meet these criteria. After reviewing both national and state precedents and enactments, the court declared that "the history of the law's treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man and one woman, together with recent [legislative] reaffirmations of that view lead invariably to the conclusion that the right to enter a same-sex marriage is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process." Likewise, the court rejected petitioners' challenges under the privacy provision of the Arizona Constitution (Art. 2, § 8) and under the equal protection clause of the federconstitutionion and the equal privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution.
As for inequities that might arise for children raised by same-sex couples not entitled to a state-sanctioned marriage relationship, the court declared that such inequity was not sufficient to defeat the state's rational basis of promoting procreation and child-rearing by limiting marriage to those of the opposite sex. According to the panel, "[a]ny inequity must be addressed and remedied by the legislature."
The decision was authored by Judge Timmer with Judges Gemmill and Portley concurring.
On October 8, 2003, a panel of Division One upheld Arizona's statutory ban on same-sex marriages against challenge under the state and federal constitutions. This special action was brought after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lawrence v. Texas striking down as violative of due process those laws which criminalize sexual activity between persons of the same sex. Petitioners argued that Lawrence implicitly recognized a fundamental right to same-sex marriage and that Arizona's statutory ban on such marriage (see A.R.S. §§ 25-101(C), 25-125(A)) could not withstand stricscrutinyny. The panel, however, refused to extend the holding of Lawrence declaring that there is no fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriage and that limiting state-sanctioned marriage to those of the opposite sex furthered a legitimate governmental purpose of fostering procreation in stable, long-term committed relationships.
In rejecting petitioners' arguments, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence expressly declared that its holding did not reach "whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the Lawrence decision was decided on rational basis review -- suggesting that the Lawrence Court had not recognized a protected fundamental right to enter in same-gender sexual relations.
In a noteworthy passage, the court declared that fundamental rights protected by the Arizona Constitution's due process clause "are those firmly entrenched in our state's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that may be, or may not be, shared with the rest of the country." The court found that entry into state sanctioned same-sex relationships did not meet these criteria. After reviewing both national and state precedents and enactments, the court declared that "the history of the law's treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man and one woman, together with recent [legislative] reaffirmations of that view lead invariably to the conclusion that the right to enter a same-sex marriage is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process." Likewise, the court rejected petitioners' challenges under the privacy provision of the Arizona Constitution (Art. 2, § 8) and under the equal protection clause of the federconstitutionion and the equal privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution.
As for inequities that might arise for children raised by same-sex couples not entitled to a state-sanctioned marriage relationship, the court declared that such inequity was not sufficient to defeat the state's rational basis of promoting procreation and child-rearing by limiting marriage to those of the opposite sex. According to the panel, "[a]ny inequity must be addressed and remedied by the legislature."
The decision was authored by Judge Timmer with Judges Gemmill and Portley concurring.
