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Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Pima County v. Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council: Supreme Court Holds That Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council Rule XIII-4(I) Giving the Council Broad Discretion to Revoke or Modify the Employer’s Disciplinary Action Is Consistent With the “Recognized Merit System Principles of Public Employment” Under A.R.S. § 38-1003
Deputy Sheriff Joseph Harvey appealed the decision to terminate his employment to the Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council, which reversed the termination decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Council’s decision, finding that the standard it applied in reviewing the employer’s decision, set forth in Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council Rule XIII-4(I), failed to give appropriate deference to the employer’s decision, and thus was not a “recognized merit system” principle of public employment in violation of A.R.S. § 38-1003. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that nothing in A.R.S. § 38-1003 “requires a council to adopt any particular standard.” Moreover, although other case law has articulated some “recognized merit system principles of public employment” (a term not defined in the statute), no existing authorities indicate whether procedural matters such as burdens of proof or standards of review constitute recognized merit system principles. Deferring to the Council’s interpretation of its rule as requiring the employer to prove the charges warranting discipline by a “preponderance of the evidence,” the Supreme Court found Rule XIII-4(I) consistent with merit system principles of public employment. As for the Council’s power to revoke or modify a disciplinary action if “the disciplinary action imposed was, in the sole discretion of the Council, too severe a penalty for the conduct proven,” that too comports with “recognized merit system principles of public employment.” The Court explained that nothing in A.R.S. § 38-1003 obligates merit system councils to employ any particular standard of review or to defer to the employer’s choice of discipline. Thus, while other merit systems do require more deference, that is not a statutory requirement. The reported cases modifying disciplinary action in the absence of arbitrary and capricious action by the employer have involved rules or statutes that expressly required deference to the employer’s decisions or application of the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. This difference in the underlying rules, the Court explained, explains the difference between the outcome in this case and the contemporaneously issued decision in Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office v. Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission. The Court reinstated the Council’s decision.
Vice Chief Justice Berch authored the unanimous decision.
Deputy Sheriff Joseph Harvey appealed the decision to terminate his employment to the Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council, which reversed the termination decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Council’s decision, finding that the standard it applied in reviewing the employer’s decision, set forth in Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council Rule XIII-4(I), failed to give appropriate deference to the employer’s decision, and thus was not a “recognized merit system” principle of public employment in violation of A.R.S. § 38-1003. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that nothing in A.R.S. § 38-1003 “requires a council to adopt any particular standard.” Moreover, although other case law has articulated some “recognized merit system principles of public employment” (a term not defined in the statute), no existing authorities indicate whether procedural matters such as burdens of proof or standards of review constitute recognized merit system principles. Deferring to the Council’s interpretation of its rule as requiring the employer to prove the charges warranting discipline by a “preponderance of the evidence,” the Supreme Court found Rule XIII-4(I) consistent with merit system principles of public employment. As for the Council’s power to revoke or modify a disciplinary action if “the disciplinary action imposed was, in the sole discretion of the Council, too severe a penalty for the conduct proven,” that too comports with “recognized merit system principles of public employment.” The Court explained that nothing in A.R.S. § 38-1003 obligates merit system councils to employ any particular standard of review or to defer to the employer’s choice of discipline. Thus, while other merit systems do require more deference, that is not a statutory requirement. The reported cases modifying disciplinary action in the absence of arbitrary and capricious action by the employer have involved rules or statutes that expressly required deference to the employer’s decisions or application of the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. This difference in the underlying rules, the Court explained, explains the difference between the outcome in this case and the contemporaneously issued decision in Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office v. Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission. The Court reinstated the Council’s decision.
Vice Chief Justice Berch authored the unanimous decision.
Posted date: Tue, Sep 27, 2005
