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Thursday, June 30, 2005
Rowland v. Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc.: Division Two Holds that Informal Letter Summarizing Claim was Sufficient “Complaint” for Purposes of Statute of Limitations
A few days before the two-year limitations period on his claim expired, James Rowland sent a letter to the Clerk of the Cochise County Superior Court stating: “On September 28th 2001, James D Rowland was injured by a forklift operator employed by Brown and Root. Accident took place at Fort Huachuca Arizona. Law suite [sic] would be for Liability damages, bodily injuries, down time, and medical expenses, in the amount of Five million dollars. Please call me with any questions.” The letter included Rowland’s typed name but no signature. Rowland enclosed the $130 filing fee with the letter. The Clerk refused to file the letter, deeming it insufficient to qualify as a “complaint.” After the limitations period had run, Rowland retained counsel who filed and served a proper complaint. Kellogg Brown and Root filed a motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds, which was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rowland’s letter was “marginally” adequate to constitute a complaint. A.R.S. § 12-542 requires a plaintiff to commence an “action” within the limitations period, the Court noted, and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 3 specifies that an “action” is commenced by the filing of a “complaint.” The Court reasoned that Rowland’s letter “adequately fulfilled the requirements of notice pleading” to qualify as a “complaint.” The Court noted that the letter identified the factual basis for the claim, the legal basis for recovery, and the monetary relief sought. The Court rejected the argument that the letter was insufficient under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(a) because it was not signed, noting that the Rule allows a person to sign a pleading after the omission of a signature is brought to his attention, and here there was no indication that Rowland had been informed of him omission and still refused to sign.
The opinion was authored by Judge Espinosa and joined by Judges Pelander and Flórez.
A few days before the two-year limitations period on his claim expired, James Rowland sent a letter to the Clerk of the Cochise County Superior Court stating: “On September 28th 2001, James D Rowland was injured by a forklift operator employed by Brown and Root. Accident took place at Fort Huachuca Arizona. Law suite [sic] would be for Liability damages, bodily injuries, down time, and medical expenses, in the amount of Five million dollars. Please call me with any questions.” The letter included Rowland’s typed name but no signature. Rowland enclosed the $130 filing fee with the letter. The Clerk refused to file the letter, deeming it insufficient to qualify as a “complaint.” After the limitations period had run, Rowland retained counsel who filed and served a proper complaint. Kellogg Brown and Root filed a motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds, which was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rowland’s letter was “marginally” adequate to constitute a complaint. A.R.S. § 12-542 requires a plaintiff to commence an “action” within the limitations period, the Court noted, and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 3 specifies that an “action” is commenced by the filing of a “complaint.” The Court reasoned that Rowland’s letter “adequately fulfilled the requirements of notice pleading” to qualify as a “complaint.” The Court noted that the letter identified the factual basis for the claim, the legal basis for recovery, and the monetary relief sought. The Court rejected the argument that the letter was insufficient under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(a) because it was not signed, noting that the Rule allows a person to sign a pleading after the omission of a signature is brought to his attention, and here there was no indication that Rowland had been informed of him omission and still refused to sign.
The opinion was authored by Judge Espinosa and joined by Judges Pelander and Flórez.
Posted date: Thu, Jun 30, 2005
